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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed the advances of e-money systems such as Bitcoin,
PayPal and various forms of stored-value cards. This paper adopts a mechanism
design approach to identify some essential features of di¤erent payment systems
that implement the optimal resource allocation. We nd that, compared to
cash, e-money technologies allowing limited participation, limited transferability
and non-zero-sum transfers can help mitigate fundamental frictions and enhance
social welfare, if they satisfy conditions in terms of parameters such as trade fre-
quency and bargaining powers. An optimally designed e-money system exhibits
realistic arrangements including non-linear pricing, cross-subsidization and posi-
tive interchange fees even when the technologies incur no costs. Regulations such
as a cap on interchange fees (à la the Dodd-Frank Act) can distort the optimal
mechanism and reduce welfare.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a number of retail payment innovations known as elec-
tronic money (or e-money).1 The latest generation of electronic money substantially
improves the performance of payment instruments in terms of convenience, durabil-
ity and transaction speed.2 However, although the emergence and adoption of new
media of exchange - for example, from Yap stones to shell money to paper money to
e-money - have been taking place over the course of history, the basic functioning of
the payment system for monetary exchange remains largely unchanged. In a monetary
payment system, whether a Yap stone or paper money is used, in order to purchase
a product, a buyer needs to rst acquire the means of payment from others, bring it
to the point of sale, and conduct a quid pro quo exchange with the seller, who then
uses the means of payment in other transactions. These observations seem to sug-
gest the existence of deep, fundamental frictions that underlie and determine the basic
mode of monetary exchange. Payment technologies have certainly evolved over time.
It is unclear, though, whether all of these improvements are useful for overcoming the
deep frictions that shape the basic functioning of payment systems. The emergence
of e-money provides an opportunity for understanding and answering some basic but
important questions about payment systems: is e-money merely another kind of sea
shells, or instead something fundamentally di¤erent from conventional money, some-
thing that helps mitigate deep frictions? What are these frictions? How do various
payment systems emerge endogenously in response to these frictions? Is there any need
1The Survey of Electronic Money Developments by the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems (CPSS) noted that in a sizeable number of the countries surveyed, card-based e-money
schemes have been launched and are operating relatively successfully: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Network-based schemes are operational or are under trial
in a few countries (Australia, Austria, Colombia, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States),
but remain limited in their usage, scope and application.(CPSS, 2001)
2There is no universal denition for e-money that can t precisely all exisiting variants of e-money
products. One denition of e-money proposed by CPSS is the following: it is the monetary value
represented by a claim on the issuers which is stored on an electronic device such as a chip card or a
hard drive in personal computers or servers or other devices such as mobile phones and issued upon
receipt of funds in an amount not less in value than the monetary value received and accepted as a
means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.This dention is quite broad (e.g. including
debit cards), and at the same time quite narrow (e.g. excluding Bitcoin). Similarly, the European
Central Bank denes e-money as an electronic store of monetary value on a technical device that
may be widely used for making payments to entities other than the e-money issuer.For the purpose
of this paper, we dont need to stick with one specic denition of e-money. Instead, we will examine
several features that are commonly found in e-money products.
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for government to regulate e-money payment systems in the presence of these frictions?
To answer these questions, this paper builds on recent developments in monetary
theory. It is now widely recognized that in the presence of such deep frictions as
the lack of commitment and lack of record-keeping, the use of money as a payment
instrument improves the e¢ ciency of resource allocations (Kocherlakota, 1998). In
this sense, money, as a medium of exchange, is essential because it improves e¢ ciency
relative to an economy without money. However, modern monetary theory also teaches
us that, in a world subject to frictions that render money essential, the equilibrium
allocation is typically suboptimal. This is because the use of money requires pre-
investment by impatient buyers, giving rise to a cash-in-advance constraint. In a
decentralized economy, this constraint often leads to an ine¢ cient allocation: impatient
buyers acquiring too little money, and hence being liquidity constrained in trading (for
example, due to discounting and ination). In addition, a resource misallocation can
be magnied by an ine¢ cient trading mechanism whenever the surplus from trade is
not allocated in a way respecting the pre-investment of buyers. In Lagos and Wright
(2005), all these e¤ects give rise to a so-called holdupproblem.
The aforementioned frictions that render money essential also shape the basic func-
tioning of monetary payment systems. Owing to its full anonymity and decentraliza-
tion of trades, the conventional money-based payment system typically exhibits the
following features. First, it permits non-exclusive participation: anyone can freely par-
ticipate in the monetary system to hold cash without other prerequisites. Second, it
allows unrestricted transferability: beyond transaction costs, there is no restriction on
the transferability of money balances. Any amount of cash can change hands at any
time, anywhere and between any parties. In other words, non-exclusive participation
means that there is no limitation on who can use money (the extensive margin), and
unrestricted transferability means there is no limitation on how money is used (the in-
tensive margin). In addition, all transfers are zero-sum: the amount of money balances
transferred by the payer is always equal to the amount received by the payee.
We argue that an e-money-based payment system is fundamentally di¤erent from
the money-based system because it can be free of the above-noted features. First,
e-money issuers can exclude certain agents from participation. For example, in card-
based e-money schemes such as the Octopus card system in Hong Kong, only buyers
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who have already acquired stored-value smart cards and merchants who have obtained
card readers/writers from the card operator can participate in the system to conduct
payments. Similarly, in server-based e-money schemes such as PayPal, only individual
and business users who have already signed up for an account can hold, send and
receive e-money balances. In this type of e-money scheme, non-compliance leads to
exclusion from the system. Second, e-money systems can restrict balance transfers. For
example, in centralized e-money schemes such as PayPal, the system operator maintains
user accounts and performs payment processing, and thus has the ability to block
or restrict the size or direction of balance transfers.3 In some decentralized systems
such as Bitcoin, bilateral transactions can be completed only after they are veried
and written into a general ledger by other users (e.g. Bitcoin miners). In addition,
according to CPSS (2001), it is quite common globally that the transferability of e-
money balances among end-users is restricted. Specically, 77% of e-money systems
included in that survey prohibit transferability among end-users. Furthermore, since
balances are transferred through electronic devices, it is technically feasible to have
non-zero-sum transfers: the amount of balances transferred by the payer di¤ers from
the amount received by the payee. For example, the payee receives only $97.1 for every
$100 sent to the payee through the PayPal system. Bitcoin also has a built-in feature
that allows the individual making a transaction to include a transaction fee paid to the
Bitcoin miner. This feature of e-money can allow for charging merchants fees or other
transaction fees, which are often observed in e-money payment systems.4
Of course, the fact that e-money is fundamentally di¤erent from money does not
necessarily mean that it is more essential. Next, we use a mechanism design approach
3A decentralized e-money scheme is one in which the payment network is not provided or managed
by a single network provider or operator (for example, a system in which e-money is stored and ows
through a peer-to-peer computer network that directly links users). In contrast, in a centralized
network, there is a trusted third party that manages the payment network. One example is server-
based e-money schemes such as PayPal.
4Other payment systems (such as credit cards and large-value settlement systems) may also exhibit
these features. But these systems usually require monitoring performed by banks, credit card issuers
or clearing houses who possess a richer information set and/or a stronger enforcement technology than
a typical e-money issuer. It is not clear (i) whether these arrangements (e.g. credit) are feasible in
the current environment, and (ii) whether money and e-money remain essential in an environment in
which these arrangements (e.g. credit) are feasible. In this regard, the model constructed in this paper
may not be a good one for analyzing these systems. In addition, the functioning of many traditional
payment systems relies on accounts with identied owners, making it inaccessible for some populations
or unavailable in some situations. In contrast, electronic money such as prepaid cards and Bitcoins
can function even in a setting with anonymous users a setting that renders cash essential.
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to analyze whether any of e-moneys distinctive features also make it more essential:
e-money is more essential than money if the use of e-money allows the implementa-
tion of some socially desirable allocations that are not implementable with the use
of money.5 We build a micro-founded general equilibrium model to capture these e-
money features and compare the e¢ ciency properties of di¤erent payment systems.
The starting point is a basic environment in which traditional cash is used as a pay-
ment instrument. We then gradually attach to it additional features, including some
distinctive characteristics of e-money. We identify several features of e-money that can
help mitigate fundamental frictions and enhance e¢ ciency in a cash economy. First, we
consider e-money featuring limited participation. The technical possibility of excluding
non-compliant traders allows e-money issuers to enforce pre-trade transfers (e.g. mem-
bership fees for obtaining e-money devices). Second, we consider an e-money featuring
limited transferability. The technical possibility of limiting transferability and having
non-zero-sum transfers allows the e-money issuer to enforce post-trade charges (e.g.
merchant fees and interchange fees).6
We show that only under some conditions will the introduction of e-money relax cer-
tain binding constraints faced by the money issuer and allow more exible and e¢ cient
intervention. As a benchmark, the rst main nding of our paper is that an ine¢ -
cient allocation can arise even in an optimally designed monetary system (subject to
non-exclusive participation, unrestricted transferability and zero-sum transfers). The
second main nding of our paper is that certain new features of e-money are essential
because they help achieve cross-subsidization between buyers and sellers and improve
e¢ ciency in resource allocation relative to a payment system without these features.
Interestingly, we show that e-money with limited transferability can be more or less able
to achieve e¢ ciency than one with limited participation, depending on such primitives
as buyersbargaining power and the frequency of trade. Finally, we characterize some
key properties of an optimally designed e-money mechanism, and provide examples of
simple direct and indirect mechanisms.
5See Wallace (2010) for an introduction of the mechanism design approach to monetary economics.
6While some e-money systems allow the issuer to track the identity and payment history of users,
it can be di¢ cult to implement in most anonymous systems (e.g., Bitcoin and prepaid card). One
future extension of this paper is to explore the welfare implication of introducung a record-keeping
technology into this environment. One would expect that giving an additional technology to the
e-money mechanism designer should only make it easier to achieve desirable allocations.
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Finally, our paper is highly relevant to recent policy discussion. Developments
in payment technologies raise new challenges for policy-makers. The Federal Reserve
System, for example, has been soliciting public inputs on strategies and tactics for
reforming the U.S. payment system.7 More specically, in the Survey of Electronic
Money Developments,the Bank for International Settlements highlighted that Elec-
tronic money projected to take over from physical cash for most if not all small-value
payments continues to evoke considerable interest both among the public and the vari-
ous authorities concerned, including central banks.(CPSS, 2001) Against this context,
the Bank of Canada has developed an active research agenda to understand and mon-
itor e-money products.8 While policy-makers are denitely concerned about these new
developments, so far there has been limited guidance provided by economic theory re-
garding the welfare implications of e-money adoption. To the best of our knowledge,
no existing research on e-money performs welfare analysis giving serious consideration
to fundamental frictions in payment systems. While modern monetary theory focuses
on understanding the fundamental roles of conventional money and credit, the role of
e-money has not yet been explored. Our paper is also the rst to develop a micro-
founded general equilibrium model of e-money. By uncovering essential features of
a payment instrument such as e-money, our results can provide guidance to policy-
makers on how to design the future payment systems, as well as whether and how an
e-money system should be regulated. For example, our model can be used to evaluate
the e¤ect of imposing a cap on interchange fees in an e-money system (similar to that
introduced by the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act9).
Literatures
Our paper is directly related to the literature of monetary theory. In general,
this literature focuses on an economic environment in which contracts involving inter-
temporal obligations are infeasible, due to frictions such as the lack of commitment and
lack of record-keeping, and in which money is the only durable object that can serve as
a means of payment. Lagos and Wright (2005) develop a tractable framework with the
7See the Payment System Improvement - Public Consultation Paper
(https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Payment_System_Improvement-
Public_Consultation_Paper.pdf).
8See, for example, the webpage http://www.bankofcanada.ca/research/e-money.
9See, for example, Wang (2012) for details and discussion of this interchange fee regulation.
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presence of these frictions for studying the roles of money and monetary policy. Recent
models of payment systems building on the Lagos-Wright framework include Kahn and
Roberds (2009), Li (2011) and Monnet and Roberds (2008).10 Within this literature
there is a line of research using the mechanism design approach to study the essentiality
of money and other means of payment.11 To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the
rst in this literature to study the essentiality of e-money. This question is non-trivial
because new payment technologies such as e-money do not necessarily outperform
conventional money. We show how the essentiality of e-money depends on primitives
such as preferences, technology, and agentsbargaining power, and characterize the
optimal arrangements of an e-money payment system.
As mentioned above, in a monetary economy, the socially optimal allocation (the
rst best) typically cannot be implemented without an appropriately designed mecha-
nism. Moreover, the implementation of the constrained optimal allocation (the second-
best) is usually not unique. There are two strands of research, both taking the payment
system as given, but which focus on di¤erent implementation mechanisms. The rst
strand takes an ine¢ cient trading protocol as a primitive, and studies the design of
monetary policy to mitigate this ine¢ ciency.12 For example, Lagos and Wright (2005)
and Lagos (2010) nd that the Friedman rule is optimal in these environments, but it
involves taxing agents, which is not rst best because agents will not voluntarily pay
taxes. With the use of a xed fee and linear transfers, Andolfatto (2010) illustrates
how the rst best can be implemented with voluntary participation in a competitive
environment.
The second strand of research, including Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) and Ro-
10Another line of research is the two-sided-market literature in the eld of industrial organization.
See the surveys by Rochet and Tirole (2003), Kahn and Roberds (2009) and Rysman (2009). This
literature typically studies a partial equilibrium setting and assumes a particular form of fee structures.
See Shy and Wang (2011) for a recent study on interchange fees, which uses the two-sided-market
approach to analyze a payment environment related to ours.
11Kocherlakota (1998) is the rst to use implementation theory to show the essentiality of money
in a random matching environment. Araujo, Camargo, Minetti and Puzzello (2012) show the essen-
tiality of money in the Lagos-Wright environment that is used in this paper. See Kocherlakota and
Wallace (1998) on the essentiality of money and credit; Kocherlakota (2003) on illiquid bonds; Hu
and Rocheteau (2013) on money and high-yield assets; Hu and Zhang (2014) on money and capital
with endogenous search intensity.
12This literature is growing. See Araujo and Hu (2014) on the optimal quantitative easing in
an economy with money and credit; Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008) on the propagation of shocks in
monetary economies; Cavalcanti and Nosal (2009) on cyclical monetary policy; Wallace (2014) on the
optimal monetary transfer with non-degenerate distribution of money.
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cheteau (2012), takes the suboptimal monetary policy as given, and designs the trading
protocol to mitigate the resulting ine¢ ciency. These studies endogenize the trading
protocol using a mechanism design approach, as advocated by Wallace (2010). This
literature nds that, under certain conditions, the rst best can still be implemented
by adopting an optimal trading protocol in pairwise trades. Specically, deviation from
Friedmans rule can still be optimal, and the welfare cost of ination can be zero.
Our paper is related to both strands of research. Unlike the rst strand such as
Lagos and Wright (2005) and Andolfatto (2010), we do not restrict ourselves to any
particular type of intervention, and use the mechanism design approach to endogenize
the payment instruments and payment system. Another key di¤erence from Andolfatto
(2010) is that we model matching frictions and ine¢ cient bargaining, rather than
centralized trading, which tends to understate the distortions and hence overstate the
power of policy, as argued in Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009). It makes our economy a
robust setting for optimal policies. Unlike the second strand such as Hu, Kennan, and
Wallace (2009) and Rocheteau (2012), we take ine¢ cient trading protocols as one of
the primitive inputs to the mechanism design of the payment system. Our perspective
is particularly relevant for policy-makers, such as central banks and payment system
regulators, who arguably have limited inuence over the determination of terms-of-
trade in a decentralized and anonymous situation. Overall, the mechanism design
approach is powerful, since it can help identify the essential features of e-money and
clarify their role in the payment system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model environ-
ment. Section 3 designs the optimal money mechanism, highlighting the importance of
a non-linear scheme and its limitation. Section 4 designs the optimal e-money mecha-
nism with limited participation, highlighting the importance of cross-subsidization and
its limitation. Section 5 designs the optimal e-money mechanism with limited trans-
ferability, highlighting the importance of after-trade fees and their essentiality. Section
6 extends the analysis to consider competitive pricing. Section 7 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
Our model is based on the alternating market formulation from Rocheteau and Wright
(2005). The economy is populated with two types of agents: measure one of buyers and
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measure one of sellers. Time is discrete and innite, indexed by t = 0; 1::: Alternating
in each period are subperiods of day and night: during the day a frictional decentralized
market (DM) convenes where buyers and sellers match randomly and bilaterally; during
the night a frictionless centralized market (CM) convenes where agents trade with each
other at Walrasian prices. Goods traded in the CM and DM are denoted, respectively,
as CM goods and DM goods. In the DM, agents can only observe the actions and
outcomes of their trades, and are anonymous. There is no technology for monitoring,
enforcement or coordinating global punishment. As a result, credit is infeasible and a
medium of exchange - money - is essential for trades in the DM. The stock of money is
denoted by Mt, which has an exogenous growth rate  so that Mt+1 = Mt. Let t be
the price of money in terms of the (numeraire) CM goods. New money is introduced
by lump-sum transfers such that each agent receives Tt = (  1)tMt=2 transfer of
real balances in the CM. As seen later, the real balances z  m are the relevant state
variable for an agents decisions.
Technology and preference
Agents live forever with a discount factor  2 (0; 1). Utility in a period depends on
actions in the CM and DM. In the CM, all agents can consume/produce the numeraires
(with l > 0 denoting consumption and l < 0 production) and have linear preferences
over l. In the DM, buyers can consume the DM goods, denoted by q, produced by
sellers. The utilities of buyers and of sellers are given by
eUb (q; l) = U (q) + l;eUs (q; l) =  C (q) + l;
where U(q) is the buyers utility function and C(q) is the sellers cost function in the
DM. We assume that U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0; U(0) = 0 and limq!0 U 0(q) = 1; C(0) =
0; C 0 (q)  0; C 00 (q)  0 and C 0 (0) = 0. An agents lifetime preferences are given by
E
P
t eUj (qt; lt), j = b; s.
The agents problem is as follows. We denote the value functions of a type j = b; s
with real balances ez in the CM and z in the DM by Wj (ez) and Vj (z), respectively. In
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the CM, the agents budget constraint is

+1
z + l = ~z + T; (1)
where =+1 is the ination factor capturing the change of the real price of money
across periods (time subscript t is omitted). An agent chooses real balances z to be
brought into next periods DM, which is nanced by initial CM real balances ~z, sales
 l of the numeraire and the transfer T from the central bank. Due to the quasi-linear
utility and the CM budget (1), the CM problem is given by
Wj (~z) = max
z

~z + T   
+1
z + Vj (z)

: (2)
Decision in DM
Next we turn to the DM problem. In the DM, buyers and sellers are subject to
pairwise random matching. With probability , a buyer (seller) is matched with a
seller (buyer), and with probability 1   , there is no match. Consider a buyer with
real balances zb matching a seller with zs in the DM. The trade surpluses of the buyer
and of the seller in a DM match are dened, respectively, as
Sb(q; d; zb; zs)  U (q) +Wb (zb   d) Wb (zb) ;
Ss(q; d; zb; zs)   C (q) +Ws (zs + d) Ws (zs) ;
where d is the payment of real balances by the buyer. The terms of trade (q; d) solve
the following proportional bargaining problem13:
max
q;d
fSb(q; d; zb; zs) + Ss(q; d; zb; zs)g , (3)
subject to the bargaining rule:
Sb(q; d; zb; zs) = [Sb(q; d; zb; zs) + Ss(q; d; zb; zs)];
where  2 (0; 1] is the buyers bargaining power, as well as the liquidity constraint
d 2 [ zs; zb] :
13We consider below competitive pricing and show that the main result is not a¤ected.
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Since Wb (ez) and Ws (ez) are linear in ez, the bargaining solution (q; d) depends only on
the buyers money balance zb, denoted as fq (zb) ; d (zb)g. Dene q as the rst-best
CM consumption satisfying U 0(q) = C 0(q). It is straightforward to show that the
bargaining solution fq (z) ; d (z)g is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The bargaining solution fq (z) ; d (z)g satises
d = min fz;D (q)g ;
q = D 1 (d) ;
where
D (q)  (1  )U (q) + C (q) :
Proof. Omitted.
Intuitively, when the buyer brings enough money balances to nance the rst-best
consumption (i.e. z  D (q)), then unconstrained trade is conducted with terms of
trade given by q and D (q). However, the buyer who is constrained (i.e. z < D (q))
spends all, d = z, to buy q = D 1 (z) < q. Before matching, the value function of an
agent with z in the DM, Vj(z), j = b; s, is given by
Vb (z) =  [U [q (z)] +Wb [z   d (z)]] + (1  )Wb (z) ; (4)
Vs (z) = 
Z
[ C [q (zb)] +Ws [z + d (zb)]] dF (zb) + (1  )Ws (z) ; (5)
where F is the cumulative distribution of the buyers real balances.
Equilibrium
Dene a stationary degenerate monetary equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 A stationary degenerate monetary equilibrium consists of the price sys-
tem ftg1t=0, the allocation (q; zb; zs) and the policy fMt; ; Tg ; such that
a. (agents optimization) given zb;0 and ftg1t=0, zb and zs solves (2);
b. (money markets clear) tMt = zb + zs;
c. (bargaining) q = q (zb) solves (3) ;
d. (issuers budget constraint) given t, fMt; ; Tg satises T = (  1)tMt;
e. (monetary, stationary) t > 0; t=t+1 = .
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Since Ws (ez) and Vs (z) are linear, if a seller buys money in the period t CM and
resells it in the period t+ 1 CM, the rate of return in terms of utility is t+1=t  1 =
=   1. Therefore, whenever  < , the sellers money demand zs is innite, and
hence the money market cannot be cleared. On the other hand, when  > , we must
have zs = 0. Intuitively, sellers have no need to spend money in the DM, and thus they
have no incentive to buy money in the CM as long as its rate of return is negative (i.e.
 > ). Similarly, a buyer will choose to bring an innite amount for the next CM
when  < . When  > , a buyer will not bring a money balance that is not intended
to be used in a DM match. In other words, the cash-in-advance constraint, d  zb, is
always binding in the DM when  > . In this case, using Lemma 1 and ignoring the
constant terms, we can rewrite the buyers optimization problem (2) in the CM as
max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g ; s.t. q  q: (6)
Intuitively, a buyer chooses q in the DM and acquires the real balance for the DM
trade D (q). With probability , there is a trade and the benet from consumption is
U (q). With probability 1 , the money holding is not spent and has a continuation
value of D (q). Therefore, [   (1  )]D (q) captures the net cost of acquiring the
money. A buyer will choose q = zb = 0 when U 0 (0)   [   (1  )]D0 (0) < 0,
simplied to
zb = 0,     

1 +

1  

:
Therefore, the monetary equilibrium does not exist when   . For a buyer, since the
opportunity cost of carrying nominal balances is increasing in the money growth rate
; and the return from carrying balances for trade is also increasing in the bargaining
weight , there is no incentive to hold money when  is too high,  is too low or  is
too low. These are the three ine¢ ciencies highlighted in the monetary literature: the
cash-in-advance constraint, the search friction and the holdup problem. The following
proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A monetary equilibrium exists i¤  2 [; ). If  > , then q < q; if
! , then q = q.
According to this proposition, the rst-best allocation with q = q cannot be sup-
ported when  > . The idea is that, to consume q in the next DM, a buyer
12
needs to acquire D (q) money balances in the CM. So the marginal utility gain
with respect to q is U 0(q), while the marginal cost of acquiring the balance is
[   (1  )]D0 (q) = [   (1  )]U 0(q): As a result, a buyer has an incentive to
marginally reduce q below q when
(   )U 0(q) < 0; (7)
which is true whenever  < .
So deating the economy at the discount rate is necessary and su¢ cient for im-
plementing the rst-best allocation. Furthermore, the money issuers budget con-
straint implies that a positive lump-sum tax is needed (i.e., a negative transfer Tt =
(   1)tMt < 0) to implement the rst best. If the money issuer has no taxation
power, then this simple lump-sum transfer scheme cannot implement the rst best.
The natural question is: can the rst best be supported by using more general trans-
fer schemes (than a lump-sum scheme)? The question calls for a mechanism design
approach to examine general transfer functions.
Summary
In this section, we learned that in a monetary economy with lump-sum transfers,
1. a monetary equilibrium does not exist when money growth is too high, trades
are too infrequent or the buyers bargaining power is too low;
2. without taxation, the rst-best allocation can never be achieved.
3 Optimal Money Mechanism
The previous section showed that the rst-best allocation is not implementable by a ba-
sic, lump-sum transfer scheme. However, the previous setting understates the power of
mechanism design. A natural question is whether the rst-best allocation is achievable
when the money issuer can implement any (including sophisticated) non-lump-sum
transfer scheme. In this regard, we use a mechanism design approach to design the
optimal mechanism and interpret the money issuer as the mechanism designer who can
conduct an intervention at night after the CM is closed. We consider the following
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information structure: the money issuer can distinguish between buyers and sellers,
but cannot observe an agents past actions, nor the money balances brought from the
CM - the lack of record-keeping that still renders money essential for the DM trades.
The relevant space of agent types is thus two-dimensional: whether the agent is a buyer
or a seller (observable), and how much money the agent holds (unobservable).
Thanks to the revelation principle, any equilibrium allocation of a Bayesian game
under a mechanism can be implemented by a direct mechanism, where agents report
their private information to the mechanism designer (here reporting the money balances
to the money issuer), and the mechanism designer makes monetary transfers based on
the report. For notational convenience, we will assume that the report is about the
post-transfer balance z and the pre-transfer balance can be inferred directly. An agent
who leaves the CM market with z and decides to skip the mechanism will end this
subperiod with exactly z. But an agent who plans to participate in the mechanism
will need to report the balance to the issuer. Notice that while it is feasible for an
agent to under-report any amount bz  z (i.e. hiding money), we assume that it is
infeasible to over-report any amount bz > z, since any over-reporting can be veried
(also known as the show-me-the-money constraint). Given the report, the money
issuer will transfer the agent Tj (bz) (to charge if negative), which in general can be any
function of the agents type j = s; b and of the report bz. Formally, a money mechanism
M fTb (bz) ; Ts (bz) ; g consists of transfer functions for buyers, Tb (bz) ; and for sellers,
Ts (bz), and an ination factor .
CM and DM decision
A type j = b; s agents DM value function under a money mechanismM remains
the same, given by (4) and (5). A type js CM value function becomes
Wj (ez) = ez + max
z;bz;ej2f0;1g f z + ejTj (bz) + Vj (z)g ; s.t. bz  z; (8)
where ej = 1 and ej = 0 denote, respectively, the decision as to whether to participate
or not in the mechanism. Here, an agent with z chooses to report bz subject to the
constraint that over-reporting is not feasible, and the agents report will result in
payment Tj (bz).
Incentive-compatibility for buyers
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It is straightforward to establish that the bargaining solution under a money mech-
anismM is still characterized by Lemma 1. Using the linearity of Wb (ez) and ignoring
the constant terms, we can reformulate the buyers problem under mechanismM as
max
q;bz;eb2f0;1g febTb (bz)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g , s.t. (9)
bz  D (q) : (10)
Here, a buyer who decides not to participate in the mechanism just brings z = D (q)
to the next DM, which will allow the buyer to consume q. A buyer who decides to
participate and intends to have a post-transfer balance of z = D (q) needs to bring
D (q)   Tb (bz) from the CM, and report bz  D (q), which will allow the buyer to
consume q in the following DM.
Denition 2 An allocation (q; zb; zs) is incentive compatible for buyers under a money
mechanismM if eb = 1,bz = zb; and q = q (zb) solves (9).
To induce buyers to participate in the mechanism (i.e. e = 1), it is necessary to
have an incentive-compatible allocation (q; zb; zs) satisfying
Tb (zb)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)  max
q0
f  [   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g :
(11)
Here, the left-hand side (LHS) captures the payo¤ for participating in the mechanism,
and the right-hand side (RHS) captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
Incentive-compatibility for sellers
Similarly, using the linearity of Ws (ez), and ignoring the constant terms, one can
reformulate the sellers problem in the CM as
max
z;bz;es2f0;1g f z + esTs (bz) + zg , s.t. bz  z: (12)
Here, a seller not participating in the mechanism has no reason to bring money and
thus the additional payo¤ is zero. A seller who decides to participate and intends to
have a post-transfer balance of z needs to bring z   Ts (bz) from the CM, and reportbz  z, and this balance will have a continuation value z.
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Denition 3 An allocation (q; zb; zs) is incentive compatible for sellers under a money
mechanismM if es = 1 and bz = z = zs solve (12).
Notice that, conditional on es = 0, the value of (12) is zero. So to induce sellers to
participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-compatible allocation
(q; zb; zs) that satises
(   ) zs + Ts (zs)  0: (13)
Here, the LHS captures the payo¤ for participating in the mechanism, and the RHS
captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
Money issuers budget constraint
A money issuer has to balance its budget, or self-nance:
Denition 4 A money mechanismM  fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g is self-nanced under the
allocation (q; zb; zs) if
Tb (zb) + Ts (zs) = (  1) (zb + zs) : (14)
This budget constraint states that the issuers total expenditure on transfers (LHS)
has to be nanced by money creation (RHS). The total real balances are zb + zs at
the beginning of a period, and  (zb + zs) at the end of a period. The RHS denotes
the total balances created within a period. Notice that if an allocation (q; zb; zs) is
incentive compatible for buyers and sellers under a mechanismM, then the equilibrium
conditions in the denition are satised.
Implementation of the rst best
We are interested in whether the rst-best allocation can be implemented. The
following denition introduces this concept formally.
Denition 5 A money mechanismM implements the rst best if
a. there exists (zb; zs) such that the rst-best allocation (q; zb; zs) is incentive com-
patible for buyers and sellers; and
b. M is self-nanced under the rst-best allocation (q; zb; zs).
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Dene a threshold level  of the buyers bargaining power given by
  1  
[1   (1  )]
h
1  C(q)
U(q)
i ;
which is decreasing in  and . Note that  2 (0; 1) i¤

1   (1  )U (q
) > C (q) : (15)
We are going to assume that this condition holds throughout the paper. Intuitively,
when a buyer brings cash from the CM to nance the rst-best trade q with the rst
seller matched in the subsequent DMs, the maximum (discounted) utility gain from this
future DM trade is U (q) [1+(1 )+2(1 )2+ :::] = U (q) =[1  (1  )]:
The minimum price the buyer needs to pay to induce the seller to trade is C (q). When
the above condition is violated, the maximum gain is lower than the minimum price,
and hence there is no hope for rst-best trade in a monetary economy in which agents
need to bring cash to trade.
The following proposition characterizes the implementability of the rst-best allo-
cation under an optimally designed money mechanism.
Proposition 2 There exists a money mechanismM that implements the rst best if
and only if   .
Proof. See the appendix.
In the previous section, Proposition 1 shows that, without any authority to enforce
taxation, the rst-best allocation cannot be achieved by simple lump-sum transfers.
This is because buyers have an incentive to marginally reduce q below q when (7) is
satised (i.e.  < ). According to Proposition 2, a well-designed mechanism can still
implement the rst best. To do that, the transfer scheme Tb (z) has to be designed
to induce buyers to carry the right amount of money balances to nance the rst-best
trade. In particular, when the transfer scheme is non-linear and optimally designed, a
buyer no longer has the marginal incentive to reduce q below q even when  < . To
give a concrete example, a mechanism may make a big transfer to buyers who bring and
report a su¢ ciently high money balance, and make no transfers to buyers who bring
and report too little balances. In an equilibrium in which all buyers co-operate and
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receive big transfers, ination is high. Hence, a deviator who brings too little money
and receives no transfers will su¤er a loss in purchasing power. Under this non-linear
scheme, buyers do not want to lower their money holding too much because that will
signicantly reduce their surplus from DM trades. This explains why the rst best can
be supported by the optimal mechanism. However, the power of this scheme is limited
by the size of a buyers DM trade surplus, which in turn depends on . That explains
why the rst best can no longer be supported when  is too low.
Characterization of optimal mechanism
The above discussion suggests that, to support the rst best, transfers to buyers
are needed, and hence money growth is positive. The following proposition formally
establishes this nding, which characterizes all optimal money mechanisms.
Proposition 3 If a money mechanism M  fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g implements the rst
best, then  > 1.
Proof. Suppose there exists a mechanism M  fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g that implements
the rst best with   1. Then from the proof of Proposition 2, we have
  [1   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)  Tb (zb)  [   (1  )] d + U (q) ;
 max
q0
f  [   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g ;
 max
q0
f  [1   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g ;
which is a contradiction, since q is the maximizer to the last line only if  = 1.
Simple examples
To illustrate the basic idea, suppose that  = 1. We propose a simple example of
a direct mechanism, and then an example of an indirect mechanism.
(i) Direct mechanism
This simple mechanism makes no transfers to sellers, so Ts (z) = 0 for all z. The
money growth is set to  =  and the money created is used to nance transfers to
buyers such that
Tb (z) =
(
(  1)D (q) , if z = D (q)
0, otherwise.
:
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First, note that  > 1 when   , so that a buyer with z = D (q) can receive
a positive transfer (  1)D (q) > 0 from the money issuer. As a result, this buyer
has a payo¤ which equals to  D (q) + U (q), which is positive i¤   : Under
this mechanism, a buyer with z 6= D (q) does not receive transfers, and thus has a
non-positive payo¤ because  = . Notice that this scheme is non-linear with respect
to the buyers money holding z.
(ii) Indirect mechanism: xed fee and interest payments
Following Andolfatto (2010), we derive in Appendix A an indirect mechanism with
the following features: the money issuer imposes a xed fee B on buyers, who can then
collect interest on their money balances at the rate R at the end of the CM:
R =


  1;
B = (1  )D (q) :
We show that, for su¢ ciently high , the rst-best allocation can be supported if
  . The basic idea is that the interest payment o¤sets the buyersopportunity
cost of carrying money balances to the DM. This interest payment is nanced by the
xed fee paid by the buyers. In order to induce them to pay this fee, the monetary
growth has to be su¢ ciently high so that non-participantstrade surplus in the DM is
su¢ ciently low. Notice that this scheme is piecewise linear: a xed fee plus a linear
transfer with respect to the buyers money holding z.
Summary
In this section, we learned that:
1. the rst best cannot be achieved by any money mechanism when the buyers bar-
gaining power is too low, the buyer is too impatient or trades are too infrequent;
2. a non-linear transfer scheme and monetary expansion are essential features of a
money mechanism to implement the rst best;
3. the rst best can be implemented by a simple indirect mechanism with interest
on buyersbalances, nanced by xed fees and monetary expansion.
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4 Electronic Money with Limited Participation
The type of money modelled so far is rather primitive merely a durable, inert object
for circulation. To capture recent innovations, we introduce di¤erent payment technolo-
gies. Suppose there is an e-money issuer who maintains the supply of another medium
of exchange, e-money, in addition to money. E-money shares all the basic properties
of money: it is divisible, durable, portable and cannot be counterfeited. However, as
noted in the introduction and will be discussed in greater detail in this section, e-money
is fundamentally di¤erent from money. As with the money issuer in the previous sec-
tion, the e-money issuer can distinguish between buyers and sellers. But the e-money
issuer does not have any record-keeping technology, and therefore cannot observe an
agents portfolio of money z or e-money n. Otherwise, again, the rst best may be
trivially implemented. The lack of record-keeping can be interpreted as some o¤-line
payment systems where the issuer cannot trace agentsbalances in real time. Agents
thus report their portfolio of money and e-money to the e-money issuer, and the e-
money issuer makes transfers based on the report. In this section, we are interested in
an economy where the money mechanism takes as given an exogenous money growth
rate   1 (with lump-sum money transfers given by T = (  1) (zb + zs)  0).
This assumption simplies the political economy, since there is no strategic interaction
between the money issuer and the e-money issuer.14 Moreover, we assume that the
e-money issuer has to follow the same growth rate  of money. This is to capture the
fact that real-world e-money products often involve this feature (e.g. denominated in
cash or convertible at par), and the fact that the e-money issuer, private or public,
often takes ination as given, and sets the supply to be accommodative to the e-money
demand. Note that removing this restriction will only make the e-money issuer more
powerful, and strengthen our conclusion.
E-money mechanism
Next we introduce the rst payment technology: an e-money issuer is able to restrict
participation in an e-money payment system. Specically, the e-money issuer has the
14In a companion paper, we study the equilibrium interaction between money and e-money in a
related environment.
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power to exclude agents from holding e-money in the DM, before or after trades. Notice
that the e-money issuer still does not know or control how e-money is used by agents.
Furthermore, the usage of money is unrestricted.
Again, suppose the e-money issuer conducts an intervention at the end of the CM.
We use mechanism design to characterize the optimal mechanism. Let ej = 1 indicate
that a type j = b; s agent chooses to participate in the e-money mechanism. Any
agent choosing ej = 0 will be excluded from the e-money system and cannot hold
any e-money balances in the next DM. Since agents are anonymous, this penalty can
last only one period. An e-money mechanism ME consists of two e-money transfer
functions based on the portfolio reported, denoted asME  fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g.
CM and DM decision
In the DM, the buyers value function under an e-money mechanismME, Vb (z; n; eb),
is
Vb (z; n; eb) = ebes fU [q (z + n)] +Wb [z + n  d (z + n)]g (16)
+ (1  eseb) fU [q (z)] +Wb [z + n  d (z)]g
+ (1  )Wb (z + n) :
Here, since z and n are already denominated in the unit of the numeraire, the continu-
ation value in the CM, Wb (a), depends only on the sum of the real balances of moneyez and e-money en, that is, a  ez + en. The rst term captures the case when there is
a trading opportunity, and both the buyer and the seller participate in the e-money
system (i.e. eb = es = 1). In this case, the buyer can use the total real balances
a to nance the trade. The second term captures the case when there is a trading
opportunity, but at least one of them does not participate in the e-money system (i.e.
ebes = 0). In this case, the buyer can only use the money z to nance the trade. The
third term captures the case when there is no trading opportunity. The CM value
function of the buyer under an e-money mechanismME is given by
Wb (a) = a+ max
z;n;bz;bn;eb2f0;1g f  (z + n) + ebTb (bz; bn) + Vb (z; n; eb)g , s.t. (17)
bz  z; bn  n:
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Again, the constraint restricts that the buyer cannot over-report bz; bn. In the DM, the
value function, Vs (a; es), of a seller under the e-money mechanismME, is
Vs (a; es) = esebf C [q (zb + nb)] +Ws [a+ d (zb + nb)]g (18)
+ (1  eseb) f C [q (zb)] +Ws [a+ d (zb)]g
+ (1  )Ws (a) :
Similarly, if ebes = 1, then the buyer can use zb + nb to nance the trade. If ebes = 0,
then the buyer can only use zb to nance the trade. In the CM, the sellers value
function under an e-money mechanismME, Ws (a), is
Ws (a) = a+ max
z;n;bz;bn;es2f0;1g f  (z + n) + esTs (bz; bn) + (1  es) Vs (z + n; es)g , s.t.
(19)bz  z; bn  n:
Incentive-compatibility for buyers
It is straightforward to establish that the bargaining solution under an e-money
mechanismME is still characterized by Lemma 1. Using the linearity of Wb (a), and
ignoring the constant terms, one can reformulate the buyers problem in the CM under
es = 1 as
max
eb2f0;1g;z;bz;bn;q f  [   (1  )]D (q) + ebTb (bz; bn) + U (q)g , s.t. (20)
bz  z, bn  D (q)  z:
As before, if eb = 0, the buyer brings D (q) money balances to buy q in the DM. If
the buyer chooses eb = 1 and intends to have a post-transfer portfolio of (z; n), the
buyer needs to obtain total balances D (q)   Tb (bz; bn) from the CM, report bz and bn,
and then buy q in the following DM.
Denition 6 An allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for buyers under
an e-money mechanism ME if eb = 1, bz = z = zb, bn = nb and q = q (zb + nb) solves
(20) given es = 1.
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To induce buyers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an
incentive-compatible allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) satisfying
Tb (zb; nb) [   (1  )]D (q)+U (q)  max
q0
f  [   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g :
(21)
Here, the LHS captures the payo¤ for joining the e-money mechanism, and the RHS
captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
Incentive-compatibility for sellers
Similarly, using the linearity of Ws (a), and ignoring the constant terms, one can
reformulate the sellers problem in the CM under eb = 1 as
max
es2f0;1g;bz;z;bn;n
(
  (z + n) + (1  es)  [z + n+  [d (zb)  C [q (zb)]]]
+esTs (bz; bn) + es [z + n+  [d (zb + nb)  C [q (zb + nb)]]]
)
, s.t.
(22)bz  z, bn  n:
Again, a seller joining the e-money mechanism (i.e. es = 1) has to bring extra balances
to pay for the transfer Ts (bz; bn).
Denition 7 An allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for sellers under
an e-money mechanismME if es = 1, bz = z = zs, bn = n = ns solve (22) under eb = 1.
To induce sellers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-
compatible allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) satisfying
Ts (zs; ns)  (  ) (zs + ns) +  [D (q)  C (q)]   fd (zb)  C [q (zb)]g ; (23)
where the LHS captures the payo¤ for participating in the e-money mechanism, and
the RHS captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
E-money issuers budget constraint
An e-money issuer has to balance its budget, or self-nance:
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Denition 8 An e-money mechanismME = fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g is self-nanced with
limited participation under the allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) if
Tb (zb; nb) + Ts (zs; ns) = (  1) (nb + ns) : (24)
Here, the e-money issuer nances transfers to buyers and sellers by issuing e-money
balances.
Implementability of rst best
Denition 9 An e-money mechanismME implements the rst best with limited par-
ticipation if
a. there exists (zb; zs; nb; ns) such that the rst-best allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is
incentive compatible for buyers and sellers; and
b. ME is self-nanced with limited participation under the rst-best allocation
(q; zb; zs; nb; ns).
Dene  () as the solution to
  (1  )U (q)+[ + (1  ) ] [U (q)  C (q)] = max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]D (q)g ;
and set  () = 1 if a solution    does not exist. The following proposition
establishes the condition under which the rst best can be achieved by an optimal
e-money mechanism with limited participation.
Proposition 4 There exists an e-money mechanismME that implements the rst best
with limited participation if and only if    ().
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition shows that, to implement the rst best using this e-money mech-
anism, buyersbargaining power and ination need to satisfy    (). An increase
in  facilitates the implementation of rst best because it reduces the outside option
of non-participants who use money only as their means of payment.15 However, an
increase in  has two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, it helps achieve the rst best
15Interestingly, this is consistent with a popular view that ination induces agents to adopt some
e-money products. For example, Bitcoin is considered by some to be a safe haven from ination.
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because the holdup problem is less severe and thus buyers have higher incentives to
bring the right e-money balances. On the other hand, it increases the outside option of
non-participants who also face a less severe holdup problem when using money. But,
in general, we know that  (0) = 1. Therefore, by continuity of , the rst best is
not implementable for  too low, which will be discussed in the following section.
Essentiality of limited participation
Proposition 5 If there exists a money mechanism M that implements the rst best
with , then there also exists an e-money mechanism ME that implements the rst
best with limited participation under the same .
Proof. Since M implements the rst best, from the proof of Proposition 2 it is
necessary to have
0    [1   (1  )]D (q) + U (q) max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
=   (1  )D (q) +  [U (q)  C (q)] max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
   (1  )U (q) + [ + (1  ) ] [U (q)  C (q)]
 max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g :
Thus we have    (). Then, from Proposition 4 there exists an e-money mechanism
ME that implements the rst best.
This proposition implies that, xing the money growth rate, an optimal e-money
mechanism featuring limited participation is at least as good as an optimal money
mechanism in implementing the rst-best allocation. This result may not hold in gen-
eral when the e-money mechanism has to operate under a money growth rate di¤erent
from that associated with the optimal money mechanism. Dene
  [1   (1  )]    
1   :
The following proposition gives conditions under which the e-money mechanism can
outperform a money mechanism.
Proposition 6 (Essentiality of e-money with limited participation) If  2 ; ,
then the rst-best allocation
25
(i) cannot be implemented by any money mechanism;
(ii) can be implemented by an e-money mechanism with limited participation under
some :
Proof. Omitted here.
This proposition establishes the essentiality of e-money featuring limited partic-
ipation. Part (i), implied by Proposition 2, states that no money mechanism can
implement the rst best when  < . At the risk of being repetitive, we reproduce
here the intuition: a money mechanism uses a non-linear transfer scheme to induce
buyers to co-operateand to carry su¢ cient money balances. This scheme relies on
the punishmentof eroding deviating buyersDM trade surplus by not giving them a
transfer. However, the power of this scheme is limited by the size of the buyerstrade
surplus, which depends on . When  < , the buyerstrade surplus is insu¢ cient for
inducing them to carry the right money balances. In the extreme case of  ! 0, buyers
have no surplus to be extracted.
The ability of the e-money issuer to limit participation provides an additional tool.
By threatening to exclude agents from participating in the e-money system, the issuer
can extract extra resources (especially from sellers), and use those extra resources to
induce buyers to bring the right money balances. How much resources can be extracted
from buyers and sellers? The answer is equal to the di¤erence between the trade surplus
of an e-money user and that of a money user. The power of this scheme is maximized
when money users trade surplus is zero, and this will happen when    (from
Proposition 1). In this case, the threat to exclude deviators allows the issuer to extract
the whole of the (discounted) trade surplus, which equals to [U(q)   C(q)]. This
explains why e-money featuring limited participation is essential.
The power of this scheme is still insu¢ cient to achieve rst best when  is too
low (i.e.   ). To illustrate by an extreme example, suppose that  = 1 and
 ! 0. In this case, the buyer has no bargaining power and thus the price for q is
D (q) = U(q). So to induce buyers to bring D (q) in the previous CM, the transfer
Tb has to be su¢ ciently negative that they still have a positive payo¤:
Tb   [   (1  )]D (q) + U(q) max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g  0:
However, the above discussion implies that the maximum transfer the e-money issuer
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can make is Tb = [U(q)   C(q)], which is the whole of the (discounted) trade
surplus. Plugging  = 1; D (q) = U(q) and Tb = [U(q)  C(q)] into the LHS, the
buyerspayo¤ becomes
  [1   (1  )]U(q) + [U(q)  C(q)] + U(q)
=  (1  )[U(q)  C(q)] + fU(q)  [1   (1  )]C(q)g  0:
As U(q)   [1    (1  )]C(q) ! 0, the LHS becomes negative, which is a con-
tradiction. Therefore, this example shows that, when  is small and U(q)   [1  
 (1  )]C(q) is small (but remains positive, as assumed), the rst-best allocation
is not implementable by any e-money mechanism with limited participation. This
explains part (ii) of the above proposition.
Overall, Propositions 2 and 6 characterize the implementability of rst best using
the money mechanism and e-money mechanism. When buyersbargaining power is
high (  ), an optimal money mechanism can implement the rst best. Hence, e-
money is not essential relative to money in this region. When buyersbargaining power
is moderate ( >   ), only e-money featuring limited participation can implement
the rst best, given su¢ ciently high money growth . Hence, e-money is essential
relative to money in this region. Finally, when buyersbargaining power is too low
( > ), even an e-money featuring limited participation may not implement the rst
best.16
Characterization of optimal e-money mechanism
After establishing the essentiality of e-money, we next characterize the optimal
e-money mechanism.
Proposition 7 Given , if there exists an e-money mechanism with limited participa-
tionME = fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g, but not any money mechanismM = fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g,
that implements the rst best, then Ts (z; n) < 0 and Tb (z; n) > 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
16Notice that e-money may remain essential in this region. Even though it cannot implement the
rst best, it may still improve the allocation.
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As mentioned above, when  is too low, extracting trade surplus from buyers alone
cannot raise enough resources to support the rst best. The power of limited participa-
tion helps implement the rst best by extracting surplus from sellers (i.e. Ts (z; n) < 0)
to cross-subsidize buyersholding of e-money balances (i.e. Tb (z; n) > 0). The key ben-
et of limiting participation is allowing cross-subsidization from sellers to buyers, which
is infeasible under a money mechanism.
Simple examples
Suppose that  = 1;  >  and  2 [; ). So according to Proposition 6, e-money
with limited participation is essential. We will illustrate examples of simple direct and
indirect mechanisms. In these extreme examples, sellers get zero trade surplus, but
more general cases can be similarly constructed.
(i) Direct mechanism
Under this simple mechanism, the transfer function for sellers is a xed fee:
Ts(zs; ns) =  [D (q)  C(q)] for any (zs; ns);
and the transfer function for buyers is
Tb(zs; nb) =
(
( +   1)D (q)  C(q), if nb = D (q)
0, otherwise.
:
When  > , Proposition 1 implies that buyers not joining the e-money mechanism
will choose not to trade. In this case, a buyer joining the e-money mechanism needs to
bring C(q) + (1  )d from the CM, receive a transfer Tb from the issuer, and bring
D (q) into the DM to consume q. We can show that the participation constraint is
satised when
   =    
1   :
Notice that this scheme exhibits the features of non-linear transfers and cross-
subsidization.
(ii) Indirect mechanism: xed membership fee and proportional rewards
The e-money issuer imposes a xed membership fee Bb on buyers, who can then
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collect interest on their money balances at the rate R in the end of the CM:
R =


  1;
Tb = (2   1)D (q)  C(q):
Without paying Bb, a buyer cannot use e-money in the next DM. Similarly, in order
to receive e-money in the next DM, a seller has to pay
Ts =  [D(q)  C(q)]:
The e-money issuers budget is balanced. Obviously, sellers are indi¤erent between
joining or not. Buyers have an incentive to join when
Tb  D(q) + U(q)  0;
where D(q) is the balance they need to bring to the DM so that, after the interest
payment, they have real balance D(q) to nance the e¢ cient quantity in the DM. One
can show that this is positive when   . Notice that this scheme also exhibits the
features of piecewise linear transfers and cross-subsidization. This mechanism does not
involve money. Appendix B considers an example involving money deposits. In that
example, the e-money mechanism is designed to support the positive value of money
in equilibrium.
Summary
In this section, we learned that:
1. When buyers have moderate bargaining power and the money growth rate is
high, an e-money mechanism with limited participation is essential to implement
the rst best.
2. Given the money growth rate, an optimal e-money mechanism with limited par-
ticipation is always more essential than any money mechanism; i.e. there are
scenarios where the former, rather than the latter, can achieve the rst best.
In this case, cross-subsidization from sellers to buyers is an essential feature to
implement the rst best.
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3. The rst best can be implemented by a simple indirect mechanism with xed
membership fees on buyers and sellers, and proportional rewards on buyersbal-
ances.
5 Electronic Money with Limited Transferability
Next we consider limited transferability as an alternative feature of e-money. Suppose
that the e-money issuer can no longer limit the participation of users, but has instead
the power to block e-money transfers among agents in the DM. However, the e-money
issuer again does not have any record-keeping technology, and therefore does not know
the amount of e-money transferred or the true identities of the payer and payee. In the
DM, a payer chooses whether to pay the e-money issuer b units of e-money in order to
transfer e-money to someone else. If this fee is not paid, then the e-money transfer will
be blocked by the issuer. Similarly, a payee chooses whether to pay the e-money issuer
s units of e-money in order to receive e-money from someone else. Otherwise, the
transfer is blocked. We interpret b and s as interchange fees. We focus on the case
b + s  0, in which otherwise buyers and sellers can fake DM trades (by sending
and receiving an arbitrary small amount of e-money) to earn the transfer b + s
from the e-money issuer. Notice that limited transferability is di¤erent from limited
participation: in a mechanism with limited participation, agents need to pay fees to
join the e-money mechanism, in order to use e-money in the DM; in a mechanism with
limited transferability, agents rst match in the DM and then decide whether to pay
the interchange fees for using e-money as the means of payment, regardless of whether
they have joined the e-money mechanism in advance. An important distinction is
that a mechanism featuring limited participation collects fees only in the CM, while
a mechanism featuring limited transferability can also collect fees in the DM. This
distinction leads to di¤erent abilities to implement the rst-best allocation.17 In the
CM, e-money is assumed to be freely transferable among agents.18
CM and DM decision
17Note that the money issuer does not need to be physically present in a bilateral match in order
to collect the interchange fees. Instead, in the absence of a zero-sum constraint, part of the balances
transferred can be destroyed automatically in the payment process.
18Allowing the issuer to have the additional power to restrict transferability in the CM can only
strengthen our ndings.
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An e-money mechanism ML featuring limited transferability consists of the e-
money transfer functions based on the portfolio reported and fees in the DM, denoted
asML  fb;s; Tb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g. In the DM, the buyers value function under an
e-money mechanismML, Vb (z; n), is
Vb (z; n) = 

U [q (z; n)] +Wb

z + n  dz (z; n)  dn (z; n)  Idn(z;n)>0b

(25)
+ (1  )Wb (z + n) ;
where fq (z; n) ; dz (z; n) ; dn (z; n)g is the bargaining solution as a function of the buyers
portfolio. It species that the buyer needs to pay dz units of real money balances and
dn units of real e-money balances for q units of the DM goods produced by the seller.
Idn(z;n)>0 is an indicator function capturing the fact that the buyer needs to pay the
fee b whenever e-money payment is positive, or dn (z; n) > 0.
Wb (a) is the CM value function of the buyer under an e-money mechanism ML,
which is given by
Wb (a) = a+ max
z;bz;n;bn
eb2f0;1g
f  (z + n) + ebTb (bz; bn) + Vb (z; n)g ; (26)
s.t. bz  z, bn  n:
Unlike in the case of limited participation, the DM value function does not depend
on the choice of eb, because the e-money issuer cannot restrict the buyers e-money
transfer conditional on eb.
In the DM, the value function, Vs (a), of a seller who has joined an e-money mech-
anismML is
Vs (a) = 
 C [q (zb; nb)] +Ws a+ dz (zb; nb) + dn (zb; nb)  Idn(zb;nb)>0s(27)
+ (1  )Ws (a) :
Again, the seller needs to pay a fee s in order to receive the e-money payment
dn (zb; nb) > 0.
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In the CM, the sellers value function under an e-money mechanismML, Ws (a), is
Ws (a) = max
z;bz;n;bn
es2f0;1g
fa   (z + n) + esTs (bz; bn) + Vs (z + n)g ; (28)
s.t. bz  z, bn  n:
Bargaining solution
Given the terms of trade (q; dz; dn), the DM trade surpluses of the buyer and the
seller are, respectively,
Sb(q; dz; dn) = U (q) +Wb (zb + nb   dz   dn   Idn>0b) Wb (zb + nb) ;
Ss(q; dz; dn) =  C (q) +Ws (as + dz + dn   Idn>0s) Ws (as)
=  C (q) +Ws (dz + dn   Idn>0s) Ws (0) :
By linearity of Ws, the surplus does not depend on the sellers balances as. Under an
e-money mechanism ML, the bargaining solution fq (zb; nb) ; dz (zb; nb) ; dz (zb; nb)g is
given by
max
q;dz ;dn
Sb(q; dz; dn) + Ss(q; dz; dn), s.t. (29)
Sb(q; dz; dn) = [Sb(q; dz; dn) + Ss(q; dz; dn)];
dz  zb; (30)
dn + Idn>0b  nb; (31)
Idn>0s  dn: (32)
Here, the rst constraint is the pricing protocol. The second and third are, respectively,
the buyers liquidity constraints on money and e-money payments. The last constraint
requires that the sellers e-money balance received be su¢ cient for nancing the inter-
change fee imposed on the seller. Here, we assume that sellers cannot use their own
balances to pay the fee.
Using the fact that Wb (a) and Ws (a) are linear, the bargaining problem (29) can
be reformulated as
max
q;dz ;dn
fU (q)  C (q)  Idn>0 (b + s)g , s.t. (30), (31), (32), and (33)
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(1  ) [U (q)  dz   dn   Idn>0b] =  [ C (q) + dz + dn   Idn>0s] :
Dene   b + s. It is straightforward to show the following lemma, which
characterizes the bargaining solution underML.
Lemma 2 The bargaining solution fq (zb; nb) ; dz (zb; nb) ; dn (zb; nb)g satises:
dz = min fzb; (1  )U + Cg ;
dn + Idn>0b =
8><>:
min fnb; (1  )U + C +   dzg ;
if nb   and U (q)  C (q)   U (q (zb))  C (q (zb))
0; otherwise
D (q) = dz + dn + Idn>0 (b   ) :
The key di¤erence from the bargaining solution in the previous section is that the
buyer and the seller now have to share the total interchange fee  according to their
bargaining weights. In the presence of interchange fees, there is a pecking order of
payment: using money before e-money to avoid paying the interchange fees. The
interchange fees partially pass through to prices. From Lemma 2 the total payment
made by the buyer is given by dz + dn + Idn>0b = D (q) + Idn>0, and the total
payment received by the seller is given by dz+dn Idn>0s = D (q) Idn>0 (1  ) . A
higher buyers bargaining power  will result in a higher pass-through of the interchange
fees  on the total payment made by the buyer.
Incentive-compatibility for buyers
Using the linearity of Wb (a), and ignoring the constant terms, one can reformulate
the buyers problem in the CM as
maxbz;z;bn;n;
es2f0;1g
(
  (  ) (z + n) + ebTb (bz; bn)
+ [U [q (z; n)]  dz (z; n)  dn (z; n)  Idn>0b]
)
; (34)
s.t. bz  z, bn  n:
Denition 10 An allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for buyers under
an e-money mechanismML if eb = 1, bz = zb, bn = nb, and q solves (34).
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Notice that a buyer who chooses to skip the mechanismML in CM (i.e., eb = 0)
will not bring e-money to the DM, because money and e-money have the same ination
rate , but using e-money involves an extra interchange fee b, as shown in Lemma
2. Thus, eb = 0 implies nb = dn = 0. As before, to induce buyers to participate in the
mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-compatible allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns),
where eb = 1 and dn > 0, satises
Tb (zb; nb) [   (1  )] [D (q) + ]+U (q)  max
q0
f  [   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g :
(35)
Incentive-compatibility for sellers
Similarly, using the linearity of Ws (a), and ignoring the constant terms, one can
reformulate the sellers problem in the CM as
maxbz;z;bn;n;
es2f0;1g
f(   ) (z + n) + esTs (bz; bn)g ; (36)
s.t. bz  z, bn  n:
Denition 11 An allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for sellers under
an e-money mechanismME if es = 1, bz = z = zs, bn = n = ns solve (36).
To induce sellers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-
compatible allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) such that es = 1 and it satises
  (  ) (zs + ns) + Ts (zs; ns)  0: (37)
E-money issuers budget constraint
Denition 12 An e-money mechanism ML  fb;s; Tb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g is self-
nanced with limited transferability under the allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) if
Tb (zb; nb) + Ts (zs; ns) =  (b + s) + (  1) (nb + ns) : (38)
Implementability of rst best
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Denition 13 An e-money mechanism ML implements the rst best with limited
transferability if
a. there exists (zb; zs; nb; ns) such that the rst-best allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is
incentive compatible to buyers and sellers; and
b. ML is self-nanced with limited transferability under the rst-best allocation
(q; zb; zs; nb; ns).
As before, dene  () as the solution to
( +   1)U (q)  C (q) = max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]D (q)g ;
and set  () =1 if a solution    does not exist. Notice that  () is increasing in
 for all nite  (). The following proposition establishes when the optimal e-money
mechanism featuring limited transferability is e¢ cient.
Proposition 8 There exists some  and an e-money mechanism ML that imple-
ments the rst best with limited transferability if and only if either (a)    or (b)
( +   1)U (q) > C (q). If (a) does not hold, then there existsML implementing
the rst best if and only if    ().
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition shows that, to implement the rst best using this e-money mech-
anism, buyersbargaining power and ination need to satisfy    (). It is straight-
forward to show that  () is increasing in . The idea is that an increase in  raises
the value of the buyersoutside option of non-participation. Higher ination is needed
to induce them to join the mechanism. Therefore, e-money featuring limited transfer-
ability can implement the rst best when ination is not too low. In particular, when
 = 1, condition (b) in Proposition 8 is always satised due to (15). In this case, the
rst-best allocation can be achieved for any , when the ination rate is su¢ ciently
high.
Essentiality of limited transferability
We rst derive conditions under which an optimal mechanism with limited trans-
ferability is at least as good as one with limited participation, and vice versa.
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Proposition 9 (a) Suppose that   . If there exists an e-money mechanism ME
that implements the rst best with limited participation, then there also exists an e-
money mechanismML that implements the rst best with limited transferability under
the same .
(b) Suppose that  > . If there exists an e-money mechanismML that implements
the rst best with limited transferability, then there also exists an e-money mechanism
ME that implements the rst best with limited participation under the same .
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 9 gives a sharp condition    that is su¢ cient and necessary for
limited transferability to be at least as essential as limited participation. Before in-
terpreting this condition, we want to check whether there are situations where limited
transferability is strictly more essential than limited participation, and vice versa. The
answer is yes, for both. For example, when  = 1, the condition in part (a) of Propo-
sition 9 is satised. In this case, xing the money growth rate, an optimal e-money
mechanism featuring limited transferability is always at least as good as an optimal
money mechanism in implementing the rst-best allocation. More generally, combining
Propositions 4, 8 and 9, we have the following result.
Proposition 10 (Essentiality of e-money with limited transferability) (a) If  =
1 and  < , then the rst-best allocation can be implemented by an e-money mechanism
with limited transferability when   . The rst-best allocation cannot be implemented
by any e-money mechanism with limited participation;
(b) If  2  ;  and ( +   1)U (q) < C (q), then the rst-best allocation can
be implemented by an e-money mechanism with limited participation when   . The
rst-best allocation cannot be implemented by any e-money mechanism with limited
transferability.
Proof. Omitted here.
This proposition provides some parameter regions in which there are di¤erent or-
ders of essentiality of e-money technologies. In general, limited transferability is more
powerful than limited participation under low  and high . The opposite is true under
high  and low . What is the intuition? On the one hand, the amount of interchange
fees passed through to the buyer is , so a low value of  means that the buyer bears
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a small interchange fee burden. On the other hand, recall that limited participation
allows the issuer to use exclusion from period t+1 DM as a threat to enforce fees in pe-
riod t. That is why the maximum surplus extractable from a seller, [D (q) C(q)],
is discounted, since the fee is paid a period in advance. In contrast, the ability to limit
transferability allows an issuer to extract the sellers trade surplus in period t DM
by enforcing interchange fees in the same period. The maximum surplus extractable
from a seller becomes [D (q) C(q)], without discounting. Therefore, the gain from
postponing fee collection, which relaxes the sellers participation constraint, is stronger
when  is high. In sum, for high  the buyer can be rewarded a large sum nanced by
the sellers surplus; for low  the buyer only bears a small interchange pass-through.
As a result, under high  and low  the technology limiting transferability can help
induce buyers to bring su¢ cient balances to support the rst-best allocation, which
cannot be done by the technology limiting participation. But will postponing fee col-
lection tighten the issuers budget constraint? No, because the issuer can always create
more e-money balances when needed. From the issuers point of view, collecting the
fee in the CM or in the following DM does not matter, as long as the money growth
rate between two CM markets can be maintained at . In particular, the issuer can
temporarily create extra e-money balances in CM, and undo them later when inter-
change fees are collected in the following DM. Therefore, limited transferability allows
the e-money issuer to postpone fee collection, maximizing surplus extraction, without
tightening its budget constraint.19
Characterization of optimal e-money mechanism
After establishing the essentiality of e-money, we now characterize the optimal e-
money mechanism.
Proposition 11 Given ,
(a) if there exists an e-money mechanism with limited transferability
ML = fb;s; Tb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g, but not any e-money mechanism with limited
participationME , that implements the rst best, then  > 0 and Tb (zn; nn) < 0.
19Note that @=@ > 0, implying that limited transferability is more essential relative to limited
participation when the discount factor is low. A real-world interpretation is that charging interchange
fees at the time of the transaction is more desirable relative to charging a membership fee in advance,
when the frequency of membership fee payment is low (e.g. annual membership paid a year in
advance).
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(b) if there exists ME = fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g but not any ML that implements the
rst best, then Ts (z; n) > 0 and Tb (zn; nn) < 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
As discussed above, to implement the rst best, the issuer has to extract trade
surplus in the DM ( > 0), which is then used to induce buyers to carry su¢ cient
e-money balances in the CM (Tb (zn; nn) < 0). Note that this scheme requires the
issuer to temporarily expand the e-money supply in the CM (to pay buyers Tb (zn; nn))
and later undo it in the DM (by charging fees ), ensuring constant money growth
across periods.
Simple examples
Suppose that  > . We will illustrate examples of simple direct and indirect
mechanisms. In these extreme examples, sellers get zero trade surplus, but more general
cases can be similarly constructed.
(i) Direct mechanism
Under this simple mechanism, the transfer functions are
Tb(zs; nb) =
(
dn   C(q), if nb = dn
0, otherwise.
Ts(zs; ns) = 0; for any (zs; ns);
where dn = D(q
) + s, and the interchange fees are
b = 0;
s = d
   C(q):
The budget constraint of the issuer is satised. Obviously, the sellers participation
constraint is satised. When  > , Proposition 1 implies that buyers not joining the e-
money mechanism will choose not to trade. In this case, a buyer has an incentive to join
the e-money mechanism to bring dn into the DM to consume q
 if  C(q) + U(q) 
0, which is always satised. This scheme features cross-subsidization from sellers to
buyers, with non-linear pre-trade transfers to buyers, and post-trade fees on sellers.
(ii) Indirect mechanism: xed membership fee, proportional rewards and inter-
change fee on merchants
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The e-money issuer imposes a xed membership fee Bb on buyers, who can then
collect interest on their money balances at the rate R in the end of the CM:
R =


  1;
Bb = C(q
)  dn;
where dn = D(q
) + s. Also, the seller has to pay an interchange fee
s = d

n   C(q):
Obviously, sellers are indi¤erent between joining or not. The issuers budget is bal-
anced. Buyers have an incentive to join when
 dn  Bb + U(q)  0;
where dn is the balance they need to acquire in the CM so that, after interest payment,
they have real balance dn to nance the e¢ cient quantity in the DM. One can show that
this is positive when  C(q) + U(q)  0. This scheme features cross-subsidization
from sellers to buyers, with piecewise linear pre-trade transfers to buyers, and post-
trade fees on sellers. This mechanism does not involve money. Appendix C gives
an example involving money deposits. In that example, the e-money mechanism is
designed to support a positive value of money in equilibrium.
Summary
In this section, we learned that:
1. Given a money growth rate, an optimal e-money mechanism with limited trans-
ferability is always more essential than any money mechanism.
2. When buyers have low bargaining power and high frequency of trade, an e-money
mechanism with limited transferability is more essential than any e-money mech-
anism with limited participation (and vice versa). In this case, cross-subsidization
from sellers to buyers using interchange fees is an essential feature to implement
the rst best.
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3. The rst best can be implemented by a simple indirect mechanism with xed
membership fees on buyers, proportional rewards on buyersbalances, and inter-
change fees on sellers.
6 Extension on Competitive Pricing
The above analysis only considers an environment with bilateral trading under the
pricing protocol of proportional bargaining, which is convenient for capturing buyers
and sellersbargaining powers and two-sided externalities. One may wonder if our result
is robust in other trading environments. In particular, if agents conduct monetary
trades in a centralized market and take competitive prices as given, they do not consider
other agentsbalances and adoption decisions, and do not have any bargaining power.
Even in that environment, however, the curvatures of U and C imply that buyersand
sellerssurpluses remain positive. As a robustness check, we show in the appendix that
all the main results on essentiality of various money and e-money mechanisms still hold,
if we reinterpret agentsbargaining powers appropriately as the relative trade surplus
at the rst best under competitive pricing,  = [U (q)  C 0 (q) q] = [U (q)  C (q)].
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Using the mechanism design approach, we have identied several essential features of
e-money that help improve the e¢ ciency of a monetary economy. First, unlike conven-
tional cash, e-money systems can exclude participation. Second, unlike cash, e-money
systems can restrict and block balance transfers and these transfers are not necessarily
zero-sum bilaterally. Our model then predicts that an optimally designed e-money
system with the above technologies can exhibit several features, including non-linear
pricing, membership fees, interchange fees and rewards to buyers. This prediction does
have some empirical support, since several successful real-world e-money systems also
possess these features. For example, the Octopus card sets a non-linear fee structure,
imposing xed and variable fees on merchants, and o¤ering rewards and discounts to
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consumers.20 PayPal also charges merchants a fee on accepting payments.21 Accord-
ing to our model, these pricing features are important components for incentivizing
participants and cross-subsidizing across di¤erent types in order to support e¢ cient
economic outcomes.
The above implications provide useful lessons for policy-makers. First, e-money is
fundamentally di¤erent from conventional money. Improved information and technolo-
gies as a result of the introduction of e-money allow more general fee structures and
can increase e¢ ciency. Second, pricing arrangements such as merchant and interchange
fees can be essential components of an optimal payment system. Hence, fee regula-
tion may distort the optimal mechanism and reduce welfare. For example, the Durbin
Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act limits the maximum permissible interchange fees
for a debit card transaction based on issuerscosts associated with processing, clearance
and settlement. Our theory suggests that imposing this type of regulation on e-money
can be welfare reducing because the optimal fee is positive even in an environment in
which the physical cost of payments is zero. Third, our theory suggests that di¤erent
payment instruments emerge to mitigate di¤erent economic frictions. For example,
there is a fundamental di¤erence between money (including e-money) and credit be-
cause consumers need to acquire balances in advance in the former but not the latter
case. The optimal design of a money-based payment system is di¤erent from that
of a credit-based system, since they are subject to di¤erent incentive and feasibility
constraints. For instance, limiting interchange fees can be optimal for some specic
payment instruments but not all.
While our paper has provided novel economic and policy insights, we have ab-
stracted from several interesting aspects. First, we did not model other potentially
useful features of e-money such as convenience and transaction speed: while these
features can enhance e¢ ciency, they may not be essential for mitigating fundamental
frictions in a monetary economy. Moreover, additional features of e-money can be eas-
ily incorporated into our environment. Second, we have assumed that there is no cost
20Merchants are subject to a fee structure involving a xed deposit, a xed monthly fee and a
variable fee proportional to transaction value. Individual buyers need to pay a xed deposit to obtain
an Octopus card. Rewards are o¤ered to cardholders, such as Octopus reward (at least 0.5% of
spending) and discounts on selected products (e.g. transportation).
21Under the basic arrangement, PayPal charges a 2.9% merchant fee plus $0.30 per transaction,
with volume discounts applied.
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of operating an e-money system to highlight the result that the optimal fee on sellers
can be positive even in this extreme setting. In a more general environment, we expect
that a similar pricing arrangement would remain optimal because it could help raise
resources e¢ ciently to nance the operation of the system. Third, our model focuses
on a simple pricing protocol proportional bargaining, because it can easily capture
the split of trade surplus between the buyer and the seller. As shown, our nding can
be generalized to other cases, including competitive pricing, where the parameter 
can be mapped to the share of trade surplus allocated to the buyer under the rst-best
allocation. Fourth, we have assumed that trading status (i.e. buyers and sellers) is
permanent because this is more realistic given the frequency of trade captured by the
model. However, our ndings will remain unchanged when types are random (espe-
cially when agents know their types before portfolio choice is made). Fifth, we have
not studied the equilibrium outcome when e-money is issued or operated by private
prot-maximizing agents. In a companion paper, Chiu and Wong (2014), we investi-
gate the potential ine¢ ciency of the market provision of e-money. Finally, our model
builds on a very standard environment used in the money search literature. Many
alternative model variations (such as endogenous entry and endogenous matching) can
be explored, but we leave those interesting analyses for future work.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
We sketch the proof for Proposition 2 as follows. First, we show that if  < , then
there does not exist any money mechanismM that implements the rst best. Suppose
that this is not the case, and denote (q; zb; zs) as the rst-best allocation implemented.
Since the equilibrium exists as the rst-best allocation, we must have   . Denote
  (   ) zs + Ts (zs). Since (q; zb; zs) is incentive compatible for sellers, from (13)
we have   0. Substituting (14) into the denition of , we have
Tb (zb)  zb =     (1  ) zs   zb: (A.1)
Since (q; zb; zs) is also incentive compatible for buyers, from (11) we have
max
q0
f  [   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g ;
 Tb (zb)  [   (1  )] zb + U (q) ;
=     (1  ) zs| {z }
0
+
 
    [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)]  0;
where we have substituted (A.1) and used the fact that
U (q)  [1   (1  )]D (q) ;
= U (q)  [1   (1  )] [(1  )U (q) + C (q)] ;
=
 
    [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] < 0:
Since we have maxq0 f  [   (1  )]D (q0) + U (q0)g  0, there is a contradiction:
On the other hand, if   , we can construct a money mechanismM that imple-
ments the rst best. Consider the following money mechanism: Ts (z) = 0 for all z,
 =  and
Tb (z) =
(
(  1)D (q) , if z = D (q)
0, otherwise.
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B Implementation by Indirect Mechanisms: Interest-
Bearing Money
So far, we have exploited the power of the revelation principle and focused on the
set of direct mechanisms that implements the rst-best allocation when   . In
general, the reverse of the revelation principle is not true: it is possible to have some
rst-best allocations that can be implemented by a direct mechanism, such as the one
constructed above, but not by indirect mechanisms. However, we will show in this
section how an indirect mechanism based on the one proposed by Andolfatto (2010)
can be used to implement the rst best when   .
As with the mechanism suggested by Andolfatto (2010), consider now the money
issuer charges buyers a xed membership fee B to collect interest on money at the
rate R in the end of the CM. The mechanism has nothing to do with sellers. Thus,
an Andolfattos mechanism is indexed by a tripleMA  fB;R; g. The optimization
problem of a buyer in the CM under an Andolfattos mechanism can be formulated as
max
z0;q;e2f0;1g
fe [ z0  B + U (q)] + (1  e) [ D (q) + U (q)]g , s.t. (B.1)
D (q) =
1 +R

z0: (B.2)
In the equilibrium, we have zb = z0 and zs = 0.
Denition 14 An Andolfattos mechanism MA  fB;R; g is self-nanced under
the allocation (q; d; zb; 0) if
Rzb = B + (  1) zb: (B.3)
Denition 15 An Andolfattos mechanismMA implements the rst best if
a. z0 = d

1+R
= zb, q = q and e = 1 solves (B.1); and
b. MA is self-nanced under the rst-best allocation (q; d; zb; 0).
Dene 0 as solution  = 0 solving
 d + U (q) = max
q0
f D (q0) + U (q0)g : (B.4)
The following lemma shows when 0 is well-dened.
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Lemma 3 There exists 0 solving (B.4) if and only if   . If such 0 exists then
0 > 1.
Proof. Omitted here.
The following proposition characterizes the set of an Andolfattos mechanism that
implements the rst best.
Proposition 12 Suppose that   . There exists an Andolfattos mechanism that
implements the rst best, which is constructed as follows:
a.   0;
b. R = 

  1; and
c. B =  (1  ) d.
Proof. Omitted.
C Proof of Proposition 4
First, we want to show that if  <  () then there does not exist an e-money mecha-
nismME that implements the rst best with limited participation. Suppose that this
is not the case. Then there exists an e-money mechanism ME that implements the
rst best (q; zb; zs; nb; ns). Dene
  Ts (zs; ns)  (  ) (zs + ns)
+ [D (q)  C (q)  d (zb) + C [q (zb)]] :
The fact that (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for sellers and buyers implies
that   0 and D (q) = zb + nb. Substituting (24) and D (q) = zb + nb to (23), we
have
Tb (zb; nb)  [   (1  )]D (q) =     A  C (q)  (1  )D (q) ; (C.1)
where
A   [d (zb)  C [q (zb)]] + (  ) zs + (  1) zb + (1  )ns  0:
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Notice that the denition of  () implies that  <  () if and only if

 (1  ) + [1   (1  )]      [U (q)  C (q)] < max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g :
(C.2)
Since (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is also incentive compatible for buyers, from (21) we have
max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
 Tb (zb; nb)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)
=     A  (1  )D (q) +  [U (q)  C (q)]
=     A+  (1  ) +      [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)]
<     A+ max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g ;
where we have substituted (C.1), (C.2) and used the fact that D (q)   C (q) =
(1  ) [U (q)  C (q)]. A contradiction.
On the other hand, if    (), we can construct an e-money mechanismME that
implements the rst best with limited participation. Since    (), we have "0 
  (1  )D (q)+ [U (q)  C (q)] maxq f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g  0.
Fix any nb > 0 and zb > 0 such that nb + zb = D (q) and
 [d (zb)  C [q (zb)]] + (  1) zb  "0:
Consider the rst-best allocation (q; zb; 0; nb; 0) and the following e-money mechanism
ME:
Ts (z; n) =  [D (q
)  C (q)  d (zb) + C [q (zb)]] ; (C.3)
Tb (z; n) =
(
 Ts (zn; nn) + (  1)nb, if z = zb and n = nb
0, otherwise
: (C.4)
Then it is straightforward to verify that (C.3) implies (23) and that (C.4) implies
(24) under the rst-best allocation (q; zb; 0; nb; 0) and ME constructed above. So
(q; zb; 0; nb; 0) is incentive compatible for sellers underME, andME is self-nanced
with limited participation. Finally, substituting d = zb+nb, and (C.4) into  [   (1  )]D (q) 
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Tb (zb; nb) + U (q
) maxq f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g, we have
Tb (zb; nb)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q) max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
=   [   (1  )]D (q) + (  1) (zb + nb) +  [D (q)  C (q)] + U (q)
  [d (zb)  C [q (zb)]]  (  1) zb + max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
   (1  )D (q) +  [U (q)  C (q)] max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g   "0
= "0   "0 = 0:
Therefore, (21) is satised given the rst-best allocation (q; zb; 0; nb; 0) andME con-
structed above. Thus (q; zb; 0; nb; 0) is also incentive compatible for buyers underME,
andME implements the rst best with limited participation.
D Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose that this is not the case, i.e., there does not exist any money mechanism
but an e-money mechanism ME = fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g that implements some rst-
best allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) with some  and Ts (zn; nn)  0. Consider a rst-
best allocation (q; z0b; z
0
s) under a money mechanism M = fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g, where
z0b = zb + nb, z
0
s = 0, Ts (z) = 0 for all z, and
Tb (z) =
(
Tb (zn; nb) + A; if z = z0b
0, otherwise,
where
A  (  1) (ns + nb + zs + zb) + Ts (zn; nn) :
Notice that A  0 due to the premise Ts (zn; nn)  0. Then it is straightforward to
verify that (13) is satised under the rst-best allocation (q; z0b; z
0
s) with M, since
z0s = Ts (z) = 0. Also, notice that
Tb (zb)  [   (1  )] d + U (q)
= Tb (zn; nb)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)  A
 max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g   A;
47
where the last inequality comes from the fact that (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compat-
ible to buyers underME. So (11) is satised under the rst-best allocation (q; z0b; z0s)
withM. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that (14) is satised under the rst-best
allocation (q; z0b; z
0
s) with M. Thus (q; z0b; z0s) is incentive compatible to buyers and
sellers under M, and M is self-nanced. This leads to a contradiction, since there
exists a money mechanismM that implements the rst best. Given   1, the result
that Ts (zn; nn) < 0 implies Tb (zn; nn) > 0 from the e-money issuers budget (24).
E Implementation by Indirect Mechanisms with lim-
ited participation: Membership-Reward-Deposit
E-money
Proposition 4 states that when    (; ), there exists a non-empty set of direct
mechanisms that implements the rst-best allocation with limited participation. We
are also interested in constructing some simple indirect mechanisms that can implement
the rst-best allocation with limited participation. Consider that the e-money issuer
charges sellers a xed membership fee Bs to use e-money in the coming DM. To use
e-money, buyers have to maintain a deposit of at least zb units of real money balances,
for a return in terms of a xed reward  Bb units of real e-money balances, and a
proportional reward at a rate R to load e-money in the CM. The deposit can be used
in the DM. Thus, a membership-reward-deposit mechanism is indexed by MM 
fBs; Bb; R; zbg. The optimization problem of a buyer in the CM under a membership-
reward-deposit mechanism can be formulated as
max
z0;n0;q;q0;eb2f0;1g
fe [ z0   n0 + U (q)] + (1  e) [ D (q0) + U (q0)]g , s.t. (E.1)
D (q) =
z0  Bb

+
1 +R

n0;
z0  zb:
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The optimization problem of a seller in the CM under a membership-reward-deposit
mechanism can be formulated as
max
es2f0;1g

e [ Bs +  [d  C (q)]] + (1  e) 

d

zb


  C

q

zb


: (E.2)
Denition 16 A membership-reward-deposit mechanism MM  fBs; Bb; R; zbg is
self-nanced under the allocation (q; d; zb; 0; nb; 0) if
0 = Bs +Bb   R
1 +R
(nb +Bb) +
 
1   1nb: (E.3)
Denition 17 A membership-reward-deposit mechanism MM implements the rst
best if
a. z0 = zb, n0 = nb+Bb1+R , q = q
 and eb = 1 solves (E.1);
b. es = 1 solves (E.2);
c. MM is self-nanced under the rst-best allocation (q; d; zb; 0; nb; 0).
Dene "0    (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)]   maxq f D (q) + U (q)g, where
"0  0 if and only if    (; ). The following proposition characterizes the set of
membership-reward-deposit mechanisms that implements the rst best.
Proposition 13 Suppose that    (; ) and that   1. There exists a membership-
reward-deposit mechanism that implements the rst best, which is constructed as fol-
lows:
a. R = 

  1;
b. any nb > 0 and zb > 0 such that nb + zb = d and 
h
d

zb


  C
h
q

zb

ii
+
1  1


zb  "0;
c. Bs 2
h
0;  [d   C (q)] +

1  1


zb   "0
i
; and
d. Bb =  Bs=  
 
1   1nb:
Proof. First, notice that
 [d   C (q)] +

1  1


zb   "0
  [d   C (q)] +

1  1


zb   

d

zb


  C

q

zb


 

1  1


zb
= 

d   C (q)  d

zb


+ C

q

zb


 0;
49
so the set
h
0;  [d   C (q)] +

1  1


zb   "0
i
in (c) is well-dened. Combining (b)
and (c), we have
 Bs +  [d   C (q)]  

d

zb


  C

q

zb


;
so es = 1 satises (E.2). Substituting D (q) =
z0 Bb

+ 1+R

n0 into (E.1), we have (E.1)
equivalent to
max
z0zb;q;
q0;eb2f0;1g

e

 

1  


z0   

Bb +  [U (q) D (q)]

+ (1  e) [ D (q0) + U (q0)]

;
(E.4)
where n0 = nb+Bb
1+R
, z0 = zb and q = q solve the above. Substituting (c) and (d) into
 

1  


zb   Bb +  [U (q) D (q)], we have
 

1  


zb   

Bb +  [U (q
) D (q)]
  

1  


(zb + nb) +  [U (q
)  C (q)]  "0
= max
q
f D (q) + U (q)g :
So eb = 1 satises (E.1). Finally, the construction of Bb from (d) implies that (E.3)
is satised. Thus, any membership-reward-deposit mechanism that satises (a) to (d)
implements the rst best.
F Proof of Proposition 8
In the interest of brevity, we show only the later part that if  < , thenML implements
the rst best if and only if    (). The proof of the rest of Proposition 8 just follows
the proof of Proposition 4. Dene
  Ts (zs; ns)  (  ) (zs + ns) :
The fact that (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for sellers and buyers implies that
  0 and D (q)+ b = zb+nb. Substituting (38) and D (q)+ b = zb+nb
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into (37), we have
Tb (zb; nb)  [   (1  )] [D (q) + ] + U (q) (F.1)
=  A  (1  )U (q) + [1   (1  )]  [U (q)  C (q)]
+ [   [1   (1  )]] ;
where
A =  +

1  1


b + (  1) zb + (  ) zs + (1  )ns  0:
To show the "if" part, notice that there exists ML such that A = 0 and  =
U (q) C (q). Obviously, the corresponding (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) with A = 0 is incentive
compatible for sellers underML. Also, the right-hand side of (F.1) becomes
  (1  )U (q) + [1   (1  )]  [U (q)  C (q)]
+ [   [1   (1  )]] [U (q)  C (q)] ;
= ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
 max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]D (q)g ;
where the last line uses the premise that    (). Thus (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive
compatible for buyers underML, and hence implements the rst best. Notice that the
above part is true whether or not the premise  <  is true, since the proof does not
depend on the condition  < .
To show the "only if" part, suppose that there exists ML implementing the rst
best for some . Then, (F.1) becomes
max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]D (q)g
   (1  )U (q) + [1   (1  )]  [U (q)  C (q)]
+ [   [1   (1  )]] ;
=
 
    [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] + [   [1   (1  )]] :
Under the premise  < , the rst term on the last line is negative; thus, the second
term must be positive in order to not be less than the non-negative rst line. Thus,
we must have    [1   (1  )] > 0. Since   [U (q)  C (q)], then the last line
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is less than ( +   1)U (q)  C (q). Thus we have reached    ().
G Proof of Proposition 9
To prove (a), suppose that ME implements the rst best. Then from the proof of
Proposition 4 it is necessary to have
max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
   (1  )D (q) +  [U (q)  C (q)] ;
=   (1  ) [(1  )U (q) + C (q)] +  [U (q)  C (q)]
  ( +   1)U (q) + C (q) + ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
=   [[1    (1  ) ] + ( +   1)] [U (q)  C (q)]  C (q)
+ ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
  U (q) + ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
 ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
where the second-last inequality has used the premise that   . Thus the last line
implies that    (). Then from the proof of Proposition 8 there exists an e-money
mechanismML that implements the rst best for the given .
To prove (b), suppose thatML implements the rst best. Then from the proof of
Proposition 8 we have
max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g
      [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] + [   [1   (1  )]] ;
      [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] +  (1  ) [U (q)  C (q)] ;
=

 (1  ) + [1   (1  )]      [U (q)  C (q)] ;
where the last inequality uses the fact that  2 [0; U (q)  C (q)] and the fact that
 >  implies  (1  ) >     [1   (1  )]. Thus, we have  >  (). Then by
Proposition 4 there existsME implementing the rst best for the given  as well.
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H Proof of Proposition 11
In the interest of brevity, we show only (a). Suppose that this is not the case, i.e., there
exists an e-money mechanism ML = fb;s; Tb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g that implements
some rst-best allocation (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) with limited transferability under = 0 and
some , but there does not exist any e-money mechanismME = fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g
that implements the rst-best allocation with limited participation under the same .
Given  = 0, consider a money mechanismML = fT 0b (z) ; T 0s (z) ; g where
T 0s (z) =
(
Ts (zs; ns) , if z = zs + ns
0, otherwise
T 0b (z) = Tb (z; n) + (  1) (zb + zs) :
Consider a rst-best allocation (q; z0b; z
0
s) where z
0
b = zb+nb and z
0
s = zs+ns. Then it is
straightforward to verify that (13) is satised under the rst-best allocation (q; z0b; z
0
s)
withM, since (13) and (37) are the same. Also, notice that
Tb (zb)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)
= Tb (zb; nb)  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q) +
 
1   1 (zb + zs)
 max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g ;
where the last inequality comes from the fact that (q; zb; zs; nb; ns) is incentive compat-
ible to buyers underML. So (11) is satised under the rst-best allocation (q; z0b; z0s)
withM. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that (14) is satised under the rst-best
allocation (q; z0b; z
0
s) with M. Thus (q; z0b; z0s) is incentive compatible to buyers and
sellers under M, and M is self-nanced. This contradicts Proposition 5, since there
exists a money mechanismM that implements the rst best but there does not exist
any e-money mechanism ME = fTb (z; n) ; Ts (z; n)g that implements the rst-best
allocation with limited participation under the same . Therefore, we establish  > 0.
Finally, notice that (9) is satised only if Tb (zn; nn) > 0. Thus, we prove Proposition
11.
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I Implementation by Indirect Mechanisms with Lim-
ited Transferability: Interchange-Reward-Deposit
E-money
Proposition 8 states that when    (), there exists a non-empty set of direct
mechanisms that implements the rst-best allocation with limited transferability. We
are also interested in constructing some simple indirect mechanisms that can implement
the rst-best allocation with limited transferability. Consider that to use e-money,
buyers have to maintain a deposit of at least z units of real money balances, for
a return in terms of a xed reward of  B units of real e-money balances, and a
proportional reward at a rate R to load e-money in the CM. The deposit can be used
in the DM. To receive any positive amount of e-money in the DM, the payee is charged
a xed interchange fee of  units of real e-money balances from the e-money received.
Thus, an interchange-reward-deposit mechanism is indexed by MI  f; B;R; zg.
The optimization problem of a buyer in the CM under an interchange-reward-deposit
mechanism can be formulated as
max
z0;n0;q;q0;eb2f0;1g
fe [ z0   n0 + U (q)] + (1  e) [ D (q0) + U (q0)]g , s.t. (I.1)
D (q) +  =
z0  B

+
1 +R

n0;
z0  z:
Denition 18 An interchange-reward-deposit mechanismMI  f; B;R; zg is self-
nanced under the allocation (q; d; z; n) if
0 =  +B   R
1 +R
(n+B) +
 
1   1 z: (I.2)
Denition 19 An interchange-reward-deposit mechanism MI implements the rst
best if
a. z0 = z, n0 = n+Bb
1+R
, q = q and eb = 1 solves (I.1);
b. MI is self-nanced under the rst-best allocation (q; d; z; n).
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Dene "0  U (q) C (q) maxq f D (q) + U (q)g, where "0  0 if and only
if    (). The following proposition characterizes the set of interchange-reward-
deposit mechanisms that implements the rst best.
Proposition 14 Suppose that    (). There exists an interchange-reward-deposit
mechanism that implements the rst best, which is constructed as follows:
a. R = 

  1;
b. any  2 [0; U (q)  C (q)], n > 0 and z > 0 such that n+ z =  (d + ) and
1  1


z + (1  ) [U (q)  C (q) ]  "0;
c. B =   (1 +R)    1   1n:
Proof. Substituting D (q) = z
0 B

+ 1+R

n0 into (I.1), we have (I.1) equivalent to
max
z0z;q;
q0;eb2f0;1g

e

 

1  


z0   

B +  [U (q) D (q)]

+ (1  e) [ D (q0) + U (q0)]

.
Then n0 = n+B
1+R
, z0 = z and q = q solve the above. Together with (c), we have
 z0   n0 + U (q)
=  z   n+B
1 +R
+ U (q)
=  

1  1


z   (1  ) [U (q)  C (q) ] + U (q)  C (q)
  "0 + U (q)  C (q)
= max
q
f D (q) + U (q)g :
So eb = 1 satises (I.1). Finally, the construction of B from (c) implies that (I.2)
is satised. Thus, any interchange-reward-deposit mechanism satisfying (a) to (c)
implements the rst best.
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J Competitive Pricing
In this section we show that all the results under proportional bargaining extend to
the environment with competitive pricing. In the DM, agents take a competitive price
p as given. The sellers DM problem is given by
max
q
f C (q) + pqg : (J.1)
Thus the equilibrium price is given by
p = C 0 (q) : (J.2)
We can rewrite the buyers optimization problem in the CM as
max
q
f  [   (1  )] pq + U (q)g : (J.3)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Under competitive pricing, a monetary equilibrium exists i¤   .
If  > , then q < q; if ! , then q = q.
Proof. A monetary equilibrium exists if q 2 (0;1). The rst-order condition with
respect to q evaluated at the equilibrium price p = C 0 (q) is then
  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) + U 0 (q) = 0:
Since q  q and hence C 0 (q)  U 0 (q), the above has an interior solution of q 2 (0;1)
i¤   . Notice that q is strictly decreasing in . If  = , we have C 0 (q) = U 0 (q)
and hence q = q.
J.1 Optimal Money Mechanism
It is straightforward to verify that, under competitive pricing, the buyers CM problem
under a money mechanismM is given by
max
q;bz;eb2f0;1g f ebTb (bz)  [   (1  )] pq + U (q)g , s.t. (J.4)
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bz  pq: (J.5)
To induce buyers to participate in the mechanism (i.e. eb = 1), it is necessary to have
an incentive-compatible allocation (q; d; zb; zs) satisfying
 Tb (zb) [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q+U (q)  max
q0
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q0 + U (q0)g :
(J.6)
Here, the LHS captures the payo¤for participating in the mechanism at the equilibrium
price p = C 0 (q) and d = pq, and the RHS captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
Similarly, using the linearity of Ws (z), and ignoring the constant terms, one can
reformulate the sellers problem in the CM as
max
z0;bz;es2f0;1g

 z0   esTs (bz) + 

z0

, s.t. bz  z0: (J.7)
Here, a seller not participating in the mechanism has no reason to bring money and
thus the additional payo¤ is zero. A seller who decides to participate and intends to
have a post-transfer balance of z needs to bring z + Ts (bz) from the CM, and reportbz  z0, where the balance will have a continuation value z0=.
Notice that the value after choosing es = 0 is zero. So to induce sellers to participate
in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-compatible allocation (q; d; zb; zs)
satisfying
 zs   Ts (zs) + 

zs  0: (J.8)
Here, the LHS captures the payo¤ for participating in the mechanism, and the RHS
captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
With abuse of notation, dene the share of buyer surplus at the rst best as
  U (q
)  C 0 (q) q
U (q)  C (q) : (J.9)
The following proposition characterizes the implementability of the rst-best allocation
under an optimally designed money mechanism.
Proposition 16 Under competitive pricing, there exists a money mechanismM that
implements the rst best if and only if   .
Proof. We sketch the proof as follows. First, we show that if  <  then there does
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not exist any money mechanismM that implements the rst best. Suppose that this
is not the case. Denote (q; d; zb; zs) as the rst-best allocation implemented with
p = C 0 (q). Since the equilibrium exists as the rst-best allocation, we must have
  . Denote    

1  


zs   Ts (zs). Since (q; d; zb; zs) is incentive compatible
for sellers, we have   0. The fact that (q; d; zb; zs) is incentive compatible for buyers
implies that d = zb. Substituting d = zb into the denition of , we have
 Tb (zb)  d =     1  

zs   d: (J.10)
Since (q; d; zb; zs) is also incentive compatible for buyers, we have
max
q0
f  [   (1  )] pq0 + U (q0)g ;
  Tb (zb)  [   (1  )] d + U (q) ;
=     1  

zs| {z }
0
+
 
    [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)]  0;
where we have used the fact that
U (q)  [1   (1  )] d;
= U (q)  [1   (1  )] [(1  )U (q) + C (q)] ;
=
 
    [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] < 0:
Since we have maxq0 f  [   (1  )] pq0 + U (q0)g  0, there is a contradiction:
On the other hand, if   , we can construct a money mechanismM that imple-
ments the rst best. Consider the following money mechanism: Ts (z) = 0 for all z,
 =  and
Tb (z) =
(
(1  ) d, if z = d
0, otherwise.
Proposition 17 Under competitive pricing, if a money mechanismM  fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g
implements the rst best, then  > 1.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a mechanism M  fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g that imple-
ments the rst best with   1. Then from the proof of the previous proposition, we
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have
  [1   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)
  Tb (zb)  [   (1  )] d + U (q) ;
 max
q0
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q0 + U (q0)g ;
 max
q0
f  [1   (1  )] pq0 + U (q0)g ;
which is a contradiction, since q is the maximizer to the last line only if  = 1.
J.2 Electronic Money with Limited Participation
In this section we consider the e-money mechanism ME with limited participation
without money, but with the e-money growth rate exogenously given by . It is
straightforward to verify that under competitive pricing with an e-money mechanism
ME, the buyers problem in the CM under es = 1 is
max
eb2f0;1g;bn;q f  [   (1  )] pq   ebTb (bn) + U (q)g , s.t. (J.11)
bn  pq:
To induce buyers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-
compatible allocation (q; d; nb; ns) satisfying
 Tb (nb) [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q+U (q)  max
q0
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q0 + U (q0)g :
(J.12)
Here, the LHS captures the payo¤for joining the e-money mechanism at the equilibrium
price p = C 0 (q), and the RHS captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
Similarly, using the linearity of Ws (a), and ignoring the constant terms, one can
reformulate the sellers problem in the CM under eb = 1 as
max
es2f0;1g;bn;n0;q

 z0   n0   esTs (bn) +  n0


+ es [pq   C (q)]

, s.t. (J.13)
bn  n0:
Again, a seller joining the e-money mechanism (i.e. es = 1) has to bring extra balances
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to pay for the transfer Ts (bn).
To induce sellers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an incentive-
compatible allocation (q; d; nb; ns) satisfying
 Ts (ns) 

1  


ns +  [C
0 (q) q   C (q)]  0; (J.14)
where the LHS captures the payo¤ for participating in the e-money mechanism, and
the RHS captures the payo¤ for skipping it.
Dene  as the solution to
  (1  )U (q)+[ + (1  ) ] [U (q)  C (q)] = max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) qg ;
and set  = 1 if a solution    does not exist. The following proposition estab-
lishes the condition under which the rst best can be achieved by an optimal e-money
mechanism with limited participation.
Proposition 18 Under competitive pricing, there exists an e-money mechanismME
that implements the rst best with limited participation if and only if   .
Proof. First, we want to show that if  < , then there does not exist an e-money
mechanismME that implements the rst best with limited participation. Suppose that
this is not the case, then there exists an e-money mechanismME that implements a
rst best (q; d; nb; ns). Dene
   

1  


ns   Ts (ns) +  [d   C (q)] :
The fact that (q; d; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for sellers and buyers implies that
  0 and d = nb. Then we have
  [   (1  )] d   Tb (nb) =    

1  


ns   C (q)  (1  ) d: (J.15)
Notice that the denition of  implies that  <  if and only if

 (1  ) + [1   (1  )]      [U (q)  C (q)] < max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g :
(J.16)
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Since (q; d; nb; ns) is also incentive compatible for buyers, we have
max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
  Tb (nb)  [   (1  )] d + U (q)
=    

1  


ns   (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)]
=    

1  


ns +

 (1  ) +      [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)]
<    

1  


ns + max
q
f  [   (1  )]D (q) + U (q)g :
A contradiction.
On the other hand, if   , we can construct an e-money mechanismME that
implements the rst best with limited participation. Since   , we have "0 
  (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)] maxq f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g  0.
Consider the rst-best allocation (q; d; nb; 0) and the following e-money mechanism
ME:
Ts (n) =  [d
   C (q)] ; (J.17)
Tb (n) =
(
 Ts (ns) 

1  1


nb, if z = zb and n = nb
0, otherwise
: (J.18)
Then it is straightforward to verify that (q; d; nb; 0) is incentive compatible for sellers
underME, and thatME is self-nanced with limited participation. Finally, substitut-
ing d = nb into  [   (1  )] d Tb (nb)+U (q) maxq f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g,
we have
  [   (1  )] d   Tb (nb) + U (q) max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
=   [   (1  )] d +

1  1


nb +  [d
   C (q)] + U (q)
+ max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
   (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)] max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g   "0
= "0   "0 = 0:
Thus (q; d; nb; 0) is also incentive compatible for buyers underME, andME imple-
ments the rst best with limited participation.
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Proposition 19 Under competitive pricing, if there exists a money mechanism M
that implements the rst best with , then there also exists an e-money mechanism
ME that implements the rst best with limited participation under the same .
Proof. Since M implements the rst best, from the proof before it is necessary to
have
0    [1   (1  )] d + U (q) max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
=   (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)] max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
   (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)] max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
= (1  ) [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] (  ) :
Thus we have   , and therefore from the previous proposition there exists an
e-money mechanismME that implements the rst best.
Proposition 20 If  2 ; , then under competitive pricing, rst-best allocation
(i) cannot be implemented by any money mechanism;
(ii) can be implemented by an e-money mechanism with limited participation under
some :
Proof. Omitted here.
Proposition 21 Given , under competitive pricing if there exists an e-money mecha-
nism with limited participationME = fTb (n) ; Ts (n)g, but not any money mechanism
M = fTb (z) ; Ts (z) ; g, that implements the rst best, then Ts (n) > 0 and Tb (n) < 0.
Proof. Omitted here.
J.3 Electronic Money with Limited Transferability
In this section we consider the e-money mechanism ML with limited transferability,
again without money but with the e-money growth rate exogenously given by . As
before, to induce buyers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have an
incentive-compatible allocation (q; dz; dn; nb; ns), where eb = 1 and dn > 0, satisfying
 Tb (nb) [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q+U (q)  max
q0
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q0 + U (q0)g :
(J.19)
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Similarly, to induce sellers to participate in the mechanism, it is necessary to have
an incentive-compatible allocation (q; dz; dn; nb; ns) such that, es = 1, satisfying
 

1  


ns   Ts (ns)  0: (J.20)
As before, dene  as the solution to
( +   1)U (q)  C (q) = max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) qg ;
and set  =1 if a solution    does not exist. The following proposition establishes
when the optimal e-money mechanism featuring limited transferability is e¢ cient.
Proposition 22 Under competitive pricing, there exists some  and an e-money mech-
anismML that implements the rst best with limited transferability if and only if either
(a)    or (b) ( +   1)U (q) > C (q). If (a) does not hold, then there exists
ML implementing the rst best if and only if   .
Proof. In the interest of brevity, we show only the latter part that if  < , thenML
implements the rst best if and only if   . Dene
   

1  


ns   Ts (ns) :
The fact that (q; d; nb; ns) is incentive compatible for sellers and buyers implies that
  0 and  (d + b) = nb. The issuers budget is
0 =  (b + s) + Tb (nb) + Ts (ns) +

1  1


(nb + ns) : (J.21)
Substituting  (d + b) = nb and the issuers budget, we have
  [   (1  )] (d + b)  Tb (nb) + U (q)
=   [1   (1  )] (d + b) +  + Ts (ns) +

1  1


ns + U (q
)
=     (1  )U (q) + [1   (1  )]  [U (q)  C (q)]
+ [   [1   (1  )]] :
To show the "if" part, notice that there existsML such that  = U (q)  C (q).
Obviously, the corresponding (q; dz; dn; nb; ns) with A = 0 is incentive compatible for
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sellers underML. Then we have
  (1  )U (q) + [1   (1  )]  [U (q)  C (q)]
+ [   [1   (1  )]] [U (q)  C (q)] ;
= ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
 max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) qg ;
where the last line uses the premise that    (). Thus (q; dz; dn; zb; zs; nb; ns) is
incentive compatible for buyers underML, and hence implements the rst best. Notice
that the above part is true whether or not the premise  <  is true, since the proof
does not depend on the condition  < .
To show the "only if" part, suppose there exists ML implementing the rst best
for some . Then, we have
max
q
fU (q)  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) qg
   (1  )U (q) + [1   (1  )]  [U (q)  C (q)]
+ [   [1   (1  )]] ;
=
 
    [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] + [   [1   (1  )]] :
Under the premise  < , the rst term on the last line is negative, and thus the second
term must be positive in order to be not less than the non-negative rst line. Thus, we
must have     [1   (1  )] > 0. Since   [U (q)  C (q)], the last line is less
than ( +   1)U (q)  C (q). Thus we have reached   .
Proposition 23 Under competitive pricing,
(a) Suppose that   . If there exists an e-money mechanismME that implements
the rst best with limited participation, then there also exists an e-money mechanism
ML that implements the rst best with limited transferability under the same .
(b) Suppose that  > . If there exists an e-money mechanismML that implements
the rst best with limited transferability, then there also exists an e-money mechanism
ME that implements the rst best with limited participation under the same .
Proof. To prove (a), suppose thatME implements the rst best. Then from the proof
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of the previous proposition it is necessary to have
max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
   (1  ) d +  [U (q)  C (q)] ;
=   (1  ) [(1  )U (q) + C (q)] +  [U (q)  C (q)]
  ( +   1)U (q) + C (q) + ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
=   [[1    (1  ) ] + ( +   1)] [U (q)  C (q)]  C (q)
+ ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
  U (q) + ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
 ( +   1)U (q)  C (q) ;
where the second-last inequality has used the premise that   . Thus the last line
implies that   . Then from the proof of the previous proposition there exists an
e-money mechanismML that implements the rst best for the given .
To prove (b), suppose thatML implements the rst best. Then from the proof of
the previous proposition we have
max
q
f  [   (1  )]C 0 (q) q + U (q)g
      [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] + [   [1   (1  )]] ;
      [1   (1  )] [U (q)  C (q)] +  (1  ) [U (q)  C (q)] ;
=

 (1  ) + [1   (1  )]      [U (q)  C (q)] ;
where the last inequality uses the fact that  2 [0; U (q)  C (q)] and the fact that
 >  implies that  (1  ) >    [1   (1  )]. Thus, we have  > . Then by
the previous proposition there existsME implementing the rst best for the given 
as well.
Proposition 24 Under competitive pricing,
(a) If  = 1 and  < , then the rst-best allocation can be implemented by an
e-money mechanism with limited transferability when   . The rst-best allocation
cannot be implemented by any e-money mechanism with limited participation.
(b) If  2  ;  and ( +   1)U (q) < C (q), then the rst-best allocation can
be implemented by an e-money mechanism with limited participation when   . The
65
rst-best allocation cannot be implemented by any e-money mechanism with limited
transferability.
Proof. Omitted here.
Proposition 25 Given , under competitive pricing,
(a) if there exists an e-money mechanism with limited transferabilityML = fb;s; Tb (n) ; Ts (n)g,
but not any e-money mechanism with limited participation ME , that implements the
rst best, then  > 0 and Tb (nn) < 0.
(b) if there existsME = fTb (n) ; Ts (n)g but not anyML that implements the rst
best, then Ts (n) > 0 and Tb (nn) < 0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 11.
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